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I. INTRODUCTION
It is conceivable that the [legal] profession could not regulate
itself even if it tried .... As things now stand the license [to prac-
tice law] and its implications, unaccompanied by the reality of
self-regulation, interfere with the free flow of services, informa-
tion, and exchanges in the market.'
The increase in suits against the bar involving advertising and trial
publicity, 2 the rise in malpractice litigation, and the influx of lay persons
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. A.B., 1970,
Franklin & Marshall College; J.D., 1975, Seton Hall University.
1. Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-
Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 236.
2. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Hirschkop v. Snead,
594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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into the bar disciplinary process increasingly have exposed the practice of
law to public scrutiny.3 Because of the involvement of lawyers in the
Watergate tragedy, the public may wonder whether "legal ethics" is a con-
tradition in terms.4 Alarming statistics abound. A Gallup poll indicated
that only twenty-five percent of the people interviewed gave lawyers high
ethical marks. 5 Another poll showed that only thirteen percent of those in-
terviewed had "high confidence" in law firms.6
As a result of the profession's new conspicuousness, of the surge of new
lawyers, and of constant public pressure, some authorities denounce
"voluntary compliance with professional standards" as ineffective and ad-
vocate a "shift to a coercive system.' 7 Against this backdrop, the American
Bar Association appointed, in 1977, the Commission on Evaluation of Pro-
fessional Standards, known as the Kutak Commission.8 On May 30, 1981,
this commission released its final draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which is currently the subject of nationwide debate. 9 These rules
follow by a decade the current Code of Professional Responsibility,
adopted by the ABA in 1969,10 and by the Missouri Supreme Court in
1970.11
A new code or substantial revision of the current code may be needed.
Perhaps legal ethics should not be considered in terms of moral precepts,
but in terms of law, the disobedience of which results in discipline.
12
Public pressure on the bar is high; public confidence in it low. The pro-
posed code, however, is the first since Watergate, an event that suggested
lawyer behavior needed immediate improvement.1 3 Given the attorney's
poor public image and the bar's slow response to improve it, an attorney is
left with a feeling of malaise, with a feeling that the bar has failed to police
3. See Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCHJ. 953, 959; Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal
Profession, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1272-74 (1980).
4. See Florida Bar v. Hirsch, 342 So. 2d 970, 972 (Fla. 1977). On the
general subject of the impact of Watergate on the psyche of the profession, see
Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619, 623-24 (1978).
5. J. SMITH, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 1 (1981).
6. See The American Lawyer, Apr. 1981, at 4, col. 2.
7. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUN-
DATION REsEARCHJ. 953, 959.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Chairman's Introduc-
tion (Proposed Final Draft, 1981).
9. Id.
10. See 94 A.B.A. REP. 389 (1969).
11. See note 293 infra.
12. See Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCHJ. 953, 955 & n.12.
13. See Lindgren, The Model Rules: A Forward, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 923, 924. See also Wolfram, supra note 4, at 623-24 & nn.18-20.
710 [Vol. 46
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itself. With such a feeling among the organized bar, it is little wonder that
an already distrustful public thinks lawyers have forsaken all professional
responsibility.
14
Doubts about the Missouri bar's commitment to high ethical stan-
dards, however, are unsupported by the history of lawyer discipline in
Missouri. Before adopting a new code or a substantial revision of the cur-
rent code, the bar must acquaint itself with the lessons of this history,
which should be a source of pride rather than disdain.
Although there ostensibly are two sources of control over the practice
of law, one by statute and one by court rule, 1 - the Missouri Supreme Court
now has plenary control over the discipline of lawyers, the admission to the
bar, the bar association, and the unauthorized practice of law. This con-
trol originated with the recognition of the "inherent power" doctrine in
1834, and not because of public outcry or legislative mandate. Although
14. Cf. Wolfram, supra note 4, at 620-21 (self-regulation by vague ethical
prescriptions; attempts to regulate from outside legal profession met with
resistance from judiciary). Wolfram foresees the charge that the profession is no
more than a special interest group. Id. at 621.
15. Compare RSMO §§ 484.010-.270 (1978) with Mo. SUP. CT. R. 5. The
statute provides for removal or suspension from practice (1) for being convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) for retaining a client's money unlawfully,
or for malpractice, deceit, fraud, or misdemeanor in a professional capacity; or
(3) for failing to disclose discipline in another state when making application for a
Missouri license to practice law. RSMO § 484.190 (1978). Charges may be filed in
the supreme court, the court of appeals, or the circuit court, id. § 484.200, after
which the court sets a date for a hearing, id. § 484.210. The hearing is before the
court unless the matter is filed in the supreme court or one of the courts of
appeals, in which case the original hearing can be before a commissioner. Id. §
484.250. The hearing may be held ex parte on failure by the attorney to appear.
Id. § 484.230. If the attorney has been convicted of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude, discipline may be determined summarily. Id. § 484.240. Appeals from
decisions in the circuit court are made directly to the supreme court. Id. §
484.260. These provisions have not changed substantially since the 1919 statutory
revision.
Under the court rules, there is a bar committee in each circuit. MO. SUP. CT.
R. 5.10, .12-.13. The bar committees are authorized to investigate "any matter of
professional misconduct." Id. 5.12. The standard applied is the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which has been enacted as a separate rule. See id. 4. The
hearing before the bar committee serves a probable cause function. Id. 5.12,
.13(h). Final determination in such matters is left to the supreme court, which ap-
points the bar committees. See id. 5.10, .18. The probable cause hearing may be
eliminated if an attorney has been convicted of a crime involving moral tur-
pitude, with further proceedings in the matter held in the supreme court. Id.
5.20.
There are also two sets of rules regulating admission to the bar, with the
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subject to several definitions, including an English definition,16 a
regulatory definition,' 7 and a sinister definition, 8 the doctrine arose
because existing legislation did not ensure the competence of the bar and
because efforts to enact improved legislation were unsuccessful. The bar
sought the adoption of court rules, which supersede legislation in
disciplinary matters, as it worked with the supreme court to protect the
public. Indeed, the development of legal ethics in Missouri exemplified
cooperation between the courts and the bar to ensure professionalism in
the practice of law.
To understand the supreme court's current control of discipline, a
review of early legislation and court decisions is necessary. This Article will
examine some of the problems that the early legislation caused for the
courts and will explore the extent of the influence of the organized bar in
Missouri. This Article then will discuss the court's reaction to the bar ac-
tivities. After providing the background, this Article concludes that the
power of the supreme court to regulate attorney conduct is dependent
neither on statute nor on an express constitutional grant of power, but ex-
ists inherently based strictly on the nature of the judicial department and
its need to protect the public from untrustworthy officers of the court. As a
result, this Article suggests that a new ethics code is not necessary to ensure
the proper functioning of discipline in Missouri.
II. THE EARLY YEARS: SETTING THE STAGE
A. Legislative Action
In 1804, Missouri was under the jurisdiction of the District of Loui-
siana. On October 4 of that year, the judges of the Indiana Territory, who
16. See Williams, The Source ofAuthority for Rules of Court Affecting Pro-
cedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 473 (1937). Under this definition, inherent power
is authority that can be implied and that is effective only until the legislature
removes it. Id. This use was, for English lawyers, "the only sense in which... [the
phrase "inherent power" was] ever used." Id. For an adaptation of this definition
in Missouri, see note 102 and accompanying text infra. See also notes 65 & 68 and
accompanying text infra.
17. See Williams, supra note 16, at 474. In the regulatory sense, inherent
power is power that is not derived specifically from an express grant of statutory
or constitutional power, but rather power that exists because it is essential to the
necessary function of the judicial branch. It is a power which legislation cannot
remove. Id. This definition was approached at numerous points in Missouri's
history. See notes 53, 55, 66, 100 & 217-22 and accompanying text infra. It was
this definition that the supreme court eventually adopted. See notes 282-91 and
accompanying text infra.
18. See Williams, supra note 16, at 474. Inherent power becomes sinister
when the court, merely because it is a court, assumes power without regard for a
statutory or constitutional provision of power. See id. At numerous times, it was
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were the government of the District of Louisiana, enacted "A. Law
regulating the practice of Attornies" and thereby created the first post-
colonial power to discipline Missouri attorneys.' 9 The law contained provi-
sions for licensing attorneys within the territory20 and provided for their
discipline:
If the Judges of the general court, either in the general court, or
any of the inferior courts, from their own observation, detect any
mal practice in either of the said courts, in any attorney of those
courts, or if complaint. in writing be made to them of such mal
practice in any of the said courts, the party accused shall be sum-
moned to shew cause why an information shall not be filed against
him; and if such information shall be ordered, and the attorney
thus offending shall be found guilty of the matter therein charged,
the said Judges either in the general court or any of the inferior
courts, as the case may happen, may either suspend his license
during a certain time, or vacate it all together, as they may judge
most proper .... 21
The 1804 law governed attorney conduct until 1824,22 when the Missouri
19. Law of Oct. 1, 1804 (repealed 1824) (compiled in 1804-1824 LAWS OF
THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ch. 7 (1842)). Theseprovisions can be considered the
first for the Louisiana Territory, the land that was ceded to the United States by
France under the treaty signed April 30, 1803.
As a result of the treaty and in order to effectuate the transfer of the land to
the American government, Congress, on October 31, 1803, authorized the Presi-
dent "to take possession of, and occupy the territory ceded by France to the
United States," and, unless otherwise provided for by Congress, to provide for the
interim government of the new territory. Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 1, § 1, 2 Stat.
245 (1803).
Further action by Congress came in March 1804, and provided for the division
of the new territory into two territories, the Territory of Orleans and the District
of Louisiana. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 1, 2 Stat. 283 (1804).
20. Law of Oct. 1, 1804, § 1 (repealed 1824) (compiled in 1804-1824 LAWS
OF THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ch. 7 (1842)). This initial law presumed that
lawyers would come to Missouri from other jurisdictions. It provided for licensing
following production of "a certificate from any court in any one of the United
States, where he last resided, that he is a person of honest demeanor, or a license
... to practice in any court of any one of the United States .... Id. The law also
required a minimum age of 21. Id.
There were lawyers in Missouri at this time, "mostly French who had come up
the Mississippi . . . [and who had] practiced in St. Louis." Chroust, The Legal
Profession in Early Missouri, 29 MO. L. REV. 129, 129 (1964). For a history of
these early years, see authorities cited in id. at 129 n.1. See also English, The
Practice of Law in Territorial Days, 32J. Mo. B. 273 (1976).
21. Law of Oct. 1, 1804, §4 (repealed 1824) (compiled in 1804-1824 LAWS
OF THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ch. 7 (1842)).
22. Although the law remained the same regarding attorney conduct, the
government changed twice during this period. The first change took place in
1981]
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General Assembly adopted the first state statute governing lawyer con-
duct, 23 a statute that substantially revised the 1804 law.
Initially, the new statute allowed only the supreme court to impose the
ultimate discipline, i.e., disbarment. 24 It permitted any attorney to be
struck from the rolls of the state courts for conviction of a felony, for "re-
taining his client's money after demand made by the client for the same,"
for gross ignorance, for gross neglect, and for contempt. 25 The law re-
tained the phrase in the territorial act permitting disbarment for malprac-
tice. 2
6
The circuit courts could suspend an attorney, but only for "miscon-
duct which, in the opinion of the court, is such as to justify .. .being
stricken from the rolls.' 27 When a circuit court suspended an attorney, the
circuit judge had to deliver a copy of the suspension order to the clerk of
the supreme court, whereupon the supreme court afforded the attorney an
opportunity to show cause why the circuit court order, which was
presumptively correct, was in error. 28 Following this hearing, the supreme
court could issue further orders as were necessary. 29
1805 when the District of Louisiana became the Territory of Louisiana. See Act
of Mar. 3, 1805, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 331 (1805). The Act provided for the government
of the new territory, giving it the power to establish courts. Id. § 3. The laws and
regulations in force prior to the Act continued in force, provided they were not in-
consistent with the Act. Id. § 9. On October 29, 1805, the General Court of the
new territory met and ruled that any attorney previously admitted in the Indiana
Territory would be permitted to practice in the Louisiana Territory, merely by
taking of an oath of office as an attorney. Chroust, supra note 20, at 129. Seven
lawyers were admitted that same day, and five more were admitted shortly
thereafter. Id. at 129-30. The second change occurred in 1812 when the Territory
of Louisiana became the Territory of Missouri. See Act ofJune 4, 1812, ch. 95, 2
Stat. 743 (1812). The composition of the territorial government changed at this
point from a governor and three judges to a governor, a legislative counsel, and a
house of representatives. Id. § 4. The original act concerning attorneys remained
in force as it was not inconsistent with other sections of the new territorial law. See
id. § 16.
23. See RSMO §§ 1-9, at 158-59 (1825).
24. Id. § 6, at 159. Any person disbarred by the supreme court thereby was
prevented from practicing in any court in the state. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 7. On finding such grounds, the court was directed to provide
specifically the cause for suspension in the order. Id.
28. Id. If the attorney appeared and disproved the allegations, the supreme
court was to direct "an order upon the circuit court to dissolve the said suspen-
sion." Id.
29. Id. The Act retained the provision of the territorial laws that appeared
to provide a statutory cause of action against an attorney, in the nature of
malpractice, for neglect in proceeding with matters in court. Id. § 8. That cause
6
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The next major revision of the laws regulating professional conduct
was in the revised statutes of 1835,0 which added a new substantive
ground for discipline: "mal-practice, deceit, or misdemeanor in his pro-
fessional capacity. 3 1 The Act provided, for the first time, a procedure for
disciplining lawyers. A lawyer charged with a violation of the act could be
prosecuted either "in the supreme court of the district or the circuit court
of the county in which the offense shall have been committed, or the ac-
cused resides." 32 When a charge was filed, the court had to fix a date for a
hearing, to issue process, and to serve the attorney, according to the civil
practice rules, with a copy of the process and the charges.3 3 All of this had
to be done within "a reasonable time before the return day thereof. 3 4
After the charge was filed, if the grounds for discipline were conviction of a
felony, mere production of the criminal conviction justified disbarment or
immediate suspension for a limited time.3 5
When the grounds for discipline did not include conviction of a felony,
the court could only suspend the attorney, pending full trial on the
merits.3 6 This limitation protected attorneys accused of a criminal offense
but who had not been tried.3 7 If, however, no indictment was found or no
criminal trial was held within six months, the suspension had to be lifted.3 8
In all of these cases, following the charge, the attorney was entitled to a full
jury trial of the matter; the court imposed discipline following
conviction.3 9 Following a trial by the circuit court, the attorney was
entitled to take exception to the findings and prosecute an appeal to the
supreme court, as in any other action at law.40 Any judgment of removal or
suspension, regardless of the court in which it was pronounced, was
entitled to full comity in other courts within the state. 4 1
With minor exceptions, the courts followed this procedure throughout
of action remains today under RSMO § 484.160 (1978). Such statutes are said to
augment the common law contract or tort theories of malpractice liability. See R.
MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 81 (1977).
30. See RSMO §§ 1-18, at 89-91 (1835).
31. Id. § 6, at 90. The statute retained the basic causes of action contained
in the 1824 statute, i.e., felony conviction and defalcation of client funds. See id.
32. Id. § 7, at 90. At the time, the state could be divided into four districts
for the purpose of the court's hearing cases. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5 (1820).
33. RSMO §§ 8-9, at 90 (1835). The charges could be served in any county.
Id. § 8.
34. Id. § 9.
35. Id. § 11, at 91. The record of conviction was conclusive. Id. § 14.
36. Id. § 12.
37. Id. § 13.
38. Id. This rule did not apply if the delay was caused by the absence of the
accused. Id.
39. Id. § 15.
40. Id. § 17.
41. Id. § 18.
7
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the nineteenth century. Most notable of the exceptions was a provision
substituting bench trials for jury trials in ethics proceedings, provided the
matter charged was not indictable.
42
B. Judicial Interpretation
Although the statutory procedure ostensibly protected the public, the
court almost narrowed this protection into nonexistence. Failures,
primarily in the lower courts, to enforce the statute properly and the
absence of a disciplinary mechanism outside the statute forced the
supreme court to condone what otherwise would be considered bizzare
lawyer conduct.
Thus, in Strother v. State,'43 later said to be Missouri's first ethics
case, 4 4 the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, Missouri, suspended an at-
torney for six months. 45 The ethics violation arose while the attorney was in
trial. After several warnings by the court, primarily about interrupting op-
posing counsel, he had walked out of court, telling the judge that "he
would settle that matter with him, out of doors.' 4 6 In analyzing the case,
the supreme court noted that the circuit court, under the exisiting statute,
could suspend an attorney only if the conduct was worthy of disbarment,
which the instant conduct was not. Additionally, any suspension had to be
indefinite, not for the six months imposed by the circuit court. 47 Thus,
despite the attorney's actions, the supreme court found that the circuit
court had not followed the statute, and consequently, the supreme court
reversed the circuit court and reinstated Strother. 4 8
The search for solutions to the problems posed by the statute itself and
42. Id. § 497 (1879). The other notable change was the addition of the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, in 1875, and the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in 1884,
to those courts which could admit attorneys and hear disciplinary matters. See
MO. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1875); RSMO ch. 11, §§ 605-606, 612 (1889).
43. 1 Mo. 432 (1826).
44. Strother is "[t]he first reported decision." In re Williams, 113 S.W.2d
353, 358 (Mo. App., K.C.), opinion quashed sub nom. State ex rel. Clark v.
Shain, 343 Mo. 542, 122 S.W.2d 882 (En Banc 1938). Strother was listed as one of
26 lawyers who practiced in St. Louis in 1821. See Chroust, supra note 20, at 130
& n.8.
45. Strother v. State, 1 Mo. at 432.
46. Id. Strother also was alleged to have " 'demanded, in a contumacious
manner, that his name be stricken from the roll of practising Attorneys.' "Id.
47. Id. at 433.
48. Id. Other decisions also added procedural definition to the statute. See
State ex rel. Mansur v- Kemp, 82 Mo. 213 (1884) (ethics proceedings can be
maintained by other attorneys, not just state); State v. Watkins, 3 Mo. 337 (1834)
(refusal to answer circuit court interrogatories concerning alleged falsified
records no ground for suspension); State ex rel. Jewett v. Clopton, 15 Mo. App.
589 (St. L. 1884) (costs of ethics proceeding can be assessed against complainant
if proceeding begun in bad faith).
8
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by its enforcement to the exclusion of other disciplinary methods led to the
1834 discovery of the inherent power doctrine. In State v. Foreman,49 the
circuit court found that an attorney knowingly had passed counterfeit
notes. 0 The attorney was indicted and imprisoned, but later escaped. The
circuit court then suspended him. 51 Because there was no conviction,
however, the supreme court ruled that the offense was not one of those in-
cluded in the statute, and the suspension had to be dissolved. 52 In dissent,
Chief Justice McGirk argued that Foreman should have been suspended
regardless of the statute because the power existed inherently in the courts,
i.e., independent of legislative enactment.
53
In 1879, the St. Louis Court of Appeals expanded this concept. In In
re Bowman, 54 the court agreed that the right to discipline attorneys was in-
herent in the courts and that legislation on the subject of professional
regulation had not restricted or increased the court's power. 55
As these decisions indicate, during this period, the court appeared to
struggle to protect the public in a manner consistent with separation of
powers deference to constitutional legislation. The Foreman and Bowman
decisions, however, hardly settled the issue. Decisions during the re-
mainder of the nineteenth century tantalize the reader, first by asserting
inherent power, then by taking it away. For example, in 1855, the St.
Louis Court of Appeals dealt with the St. Louis Criminal Court, which was
created by statute, and said that the statute on lawyer discipline was "not
an enabling act,"" and thus could not be the exclusive source of the court's
right to discipline attorneys. The right to discipline, said the court, "is not
derived from the Legislature. 5 7




53. Id. (McGirk, C.J., dissenting). The opinion of the chief justice was very
short: "My opinion is that causes of dismissal exist independent of the statute, and
may be inquired into beyond its provisions." Id.
As interpreted, Foreman stood for the position that the court could not go
beyond the scope of the statute in disciplining attorneys. See Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265, 281 (1883) (dictum). See also Williams, supra note 16, at 485.
54. 7 Mo. App. 567 (St. L. 1879).
55. Id. at 568.
56. State ex rel. Jones v. Laughlin, 10 Mo. App. 1, 4-5 (St. L.), rev'd, 73
Mo. 443 (1881). The court recognized that the statutory language limited charges
only to certain courts. 10 Mo. App. at 4. The court said, however, that the statute
related only "to the special proceeding to disbar, originating on charges ex-
hibited." Id. at 5. The fact that no charges could be exhibited in the court should
not leave the court "deprived of its common-law power over its officers." Id. Con-
sequently, the statute could not be read to prevent any court from protecting the
public or itself. Id.
57. 10 Mo. App. at 3.
1981] 717
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Nothing is better settled than this: that without statutory pro-
vision, and in the absence of any express statutory prohibition, the
right to determine who shall appear before it in the capacity of at-
torneys is incidental to every court of common-law powers; that it
is necessary to the preservation of the respectability of the profes-
sion, and of that respect for the judiciary which is essential to the
due administration of justice, and the preservation of the rights of
persons and of property. 58
In this instance, however, the supreme court disagreed.5 9 While
generally agreeing that the right to discipline "exists as a power inherent"
in the common law courts, 60 it found that the St. Louis Criminal Court was
a court "of purely statutory origin" and not a common law court. 61 Thus,
the criminal court was dependent for its power on the legislature, and if
the legislature failed to grant power to disbar, the power did not exist. 62
The court implied that the will of the legislature determines whether
courts possess power to discipline.
In 1895, however, the supreme court appeared to adopt the opposite
view. In State ex rel. Walker v. Mullins,63 an attorney was charged with in-
tentionally falsifying a record on appeal in a murder case. 64 The court
found that inherent power over members of the bar did exist, and would
exist, "in the absence of statutory enactment prohibiting it."'65 Thus, in
one case, the court had found no right to disbar because the legislature
had not given that right, but in the other, it had found the right unless it
was taken away. In another decision the same year, arising from the same
set of facts as Mullins, the court went further by finding it unnecessary to
determine if the legislature had granted the courts power to disbar. 66 If the
legislature had granted such a power, the court could use it; if the
legislature had not granted such a power, the court could act inherently,
58. Id. at 6. Consequently, the lower court had jurisdiction over the disbar-
ment proceeding. Id. at 3. The appeals court found that the St. Louis Criminal
Court had all the powers possessed by the circuit court. Id.
59. See State ex rel. Jones v. Laughlin, 73 Mo. 443 (1881).
60. Id. at 446. The power existed in all courts "of general and commonlaw
jurisdiction." Id.
61. Id. at 447. The court was one of limited jurisdiction, handling only St.
Louis criminal cases. Id. Such courts, it was found, are under the general
superintendent control of the circuit courts and, as a result, derive all their power
from the legislature. Id. at 447-48.
62. Id. at 448-49. The supreme court noted that the legislature "evidently
intended" to deny the disciplinary power to this court. Since the power was never
expressly conferred, it therefore did not exist. Id.
63. 129 Mo. 231, 31 S.W. 744 (1895).
64. Id. at 233-35, 31 S.W. at 744-45.
65. Id. at 236-37, 31 S.W. at 745.
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"regardless of legislative aid or action. '6 7 Another 1895 decision, from the
St. Louis Court of Appeals, however, only clouded the issue further by
stating that "where the statute prescribes the mode of disbarment, it
operates as an abridgment of the common law power inherent in courts to
regulate the conduct of their attorneys. 6 8
While it appears that Missouri courts recognized that they had a role in
regulating the practice of law independent of statute, the extent of this in-
herent power remained undefined.69 This question remained unanswered
for the first third of the next century.
III. INTO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The first twenty years of this century witnessed many enactments
governing the practice of law. The laws of 1901 of the State of Missouri
contained major changes for the practice of law, such as defining the com-
pensation relationship between attorney and client and authorizing con-
tingent fee agreements. 70 The statute overruled prior law to the contrary
and gave the attorney a lien on a client's cause of action to insure the pay-
ment of the attorney's fee. 71 Four years later, the legislature substantially
67. Id.
68. State ex rel. Storts v. Peabody, 63 Mo. App. 378, 381 (St. L. 1895).
69. It is possible to reconcile the cases. As noted in note 60 and accompany-
ing text supra, inherent power exists in courts of general jurisdiction. It can be
argued that the phrase "courts of general jurisdiction" includes only those courts
which have the power to admit attorneys. Cf. State ex rel. Jones v. Laughlin, 73
Mo. 443, 449-50 (1881) (court discovers it is difficult for court with no power to
admit to disbar). See also State ex rel. Walker v. Mullins, 129 Mo. 231, 237, 31
S.W. 744, 745 (En Banc 1895) (court having legislative power to admit has in-
herent power to disbar): This approach also would comport with the modern day
standard under which all disciplinary functions flow from the supreme court. See
generally Mo. SUP. CT. R. 5. The supreme court has the sole power to admit per-
sons to practice law. RSMO § 484.040 (1978).
70. See 1901 Mo. Laws 46, §§ 1-2. The statute provided that "[t]he compen-
sation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement,
express or implied, which is not restrained by law." Id. § 1. The contingent fee
statute was farsighted; seven years passed before the American Bar Association
adopted an ethics code permitting the contingent fee, and then only after ex-
tended debate. See 33 A.B.A. REP. 61-85 (1908).
71. 1901 Mo. Laws 46, §§ 1-2. The statute granted the attorney a lien on the
cause of action, which commenced on the filing of a petition or an answer with a
counterclaim. The lien was effective against the proceeds of the cause, "in
whosever hands they may come" and was unaffected by settlement. Id. § 1. The
statute also granted a lien on the cause of action in a contingent fee case so that,
after notice to the defendant of the attorney's contigent fee contract, the
attorney's fee could be enforced against a defendant who wrongfully distributed
proceeds to the detriment of the attorney. Id. § 2.
Prior to this time, Missouri case law had prevented an attorney's lien. See
Frissell v. Haile, 18 Mo. 18 (1853); Young v. Renshaw, 102 Mo. App. 173, 76
7191981]
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changed the licensing procedures of attorneys. Bar association concern
prompted these changes, which made it clear that the power to admit at-
torneys to the practice of law was vested only in the supreme court,7 2 and
not in all of the constitutional courts.
The 1915 and 1919 legislative sessions also changed the law. The 1915
statute defined the practice of law and forbade unauthorized practice; 73
the 1919 revision substantially changed the disciplinary process. 74
Although not adding directly to the inherent powers of the court, neither
statute has been changed substantially, 75 and as a result they formed the
basis for subsequent decisions on inherent power. In order to understand
the statutes and later decisions of the courts, it is necessary to review the ac-
tions of the Missouri courts in disciplinary matters prior to these statutory
changes.
Inherent power of the court arose first in the twentieth century in 1903
in State ex rel. Crow v. Shepherd,76 a contempt of court case involving the
nonlawyer publisher of a newspaper article containing allegedly contemp-
tuous material. 77 The contempt power of the courts had been limited by
statute to the punishment of certain actions, not including the conduct at
issue. 78 The court in Shepherd could not accept such a legislative limita-
S.W. 701 (St. L. 1903); Alexander v. Grand Ave. Ry., 54 Mo. App. 66 (K.C.
1893); Roberts v. Nelson, 22 Mo. App. 28 (St. L. 1886). Thus, the only remedy of
the attorney was on the contract. See Young v. Renshaw, 102 Mo. App. at 187, 76
S.W. at 706.
The type of lien created by the statute is a special or charging lien. See 2 S.
SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES 380-87 (1973). The other common law lien, the
general or retaining lien, still is notpermitted in Missouri. See Missouri Bar Ad-
ministration Formal Opinion No. 115 (May 18, 1979).
72. 1905 Mo. Laws 48, § 1. The new law also created the board of bar
examiners, members of which were to be appointed by the supreme court, and
charged the board with the duty of conducting bar examinations two times per
year on certain legal subjects, including legal ethics, as well as providing the
application mechanism. Id. §§ 3-10. For a discussion of the bar's involvement in
the adoption of this statute, see notes 118-20 and accompanying text infra.
73. 1915 Mo. Laws 99 (current version at RSMO §§ 484.010-.020, .150
(1978)).
74. 1919 Mo. Laws 151 (current version at RSMO §§ 484.190-.270 (1978)).
75. See statutes cited notes 73 & 74 supra.
76. 177 Mo. 205, 76 S.W. 79 (En Banc 1903).
77. Id. at 211-12, 76 S.W. at 79-80. The article was published byJ. M.
Shepherd, publisher of the Standard-Herald, a weekly newspaper in War-
rensburg, and alleged "bribery and corruption" by the members of the Missouri
Supreme Court. Id. at 211, 76 S.W. at 80.
78. See id. at 234, 76 S.W. at 88. RSMO ch. 14, § 1616 (1899) delineated
certain acts that could be punished by contempt, noting further, with reference
to such acts, "and no other." The acts that could be punished were "disorderly,
contemptuous or insolent behavior" while the court was sitting and in its view,
which tended to interrupt the proceedings or disturb respect befitting the court,
720 [Vol. 46
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tion, detailing first the common law power to punish for contempt, 79 and
then holding that legislative enactment could not rescind that inherent
power by limiting punishment for contempt to certain statutory derelic-
tions "and no other. " 80
The same contempt statute was before the court in 1909 in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Gildersleeve,8 1 when the court again
detailed at length the common law inherent power of the courts and struck
down the punishment provisions of the statute.8 2 The decision was by a
bare majority only, and a three-judge dissent byJudge Lamm typified the
concern over inherent power. If unbridled, it could become sinister and
thus destroy the separation of powers. As a result, the dissenters argued
that the legislature had the power to control what otherwise might amount
to arbitrary usage of the inherent power by the court.8 3 They argued that
legislatively regulating inherent power was not the same as destroying in-
herent power.8 4 This dissent was thought so persuasive that it was
"breach of the peace" tending to disrupt the proceedings of the court, dis-
obedience of court orders and process, and refusal to be sworn or to answer ques-
tions after being sworn. See id. The supreme court indicated the question
presented:
If the Legislature had power to abridge or impair the power of this court
to punish for contempt, then the defendant in this case could not be held
liable. But if the Legislature had no such power, then the section of the
statutes quoted is unconstitutional and not binding upon the court.
177 Mo. at 234, 76 S.W. at 88.
79. 177 Mo. at 218-28, 76 S.W. at 83-86.
80. Id. at 235, 76 S.W. at 88. "The law is well settled, both in England and
America, that the Legislature has no power to take away, abridge, impair, limit,
or regulate the power of courts of record to punish for contempts." Id. The court
did note authority for the proposition that the legislature could regulate the use of
inherent power, id., but then stated, "However, it is a contradiction of terms to
say the power to punish is inherent, but that the Legislature may regulate the ex-
ercise." Id.
Shepherd did not hold the entire contempt statute unconstitutional. See In re
Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 147-48, 106 S.W. 990, 997 (En Banc 1907).
81. 219 Mo. 170, 118 S.W. 86 (En Banc 1909).
82. Id. at 177-82, 184, 118 S.W. at 87-91, 91. In Gildersleeve, the appellant
had been adjudged guilty of contempt by the circuit court and imprisoned for 15
days. Id. at 174-75, 118 S.W. at 87. The contempt statute limited punishment for
contempt to a fine of $50 or imprisonment for 10 days. RSMO ch. 14, § 1617
(1899). Thus, as stated by the court, "If this is a valid constitutional enactment, it
is obvious that the judgment must be reversed." 219 Mo. at 176, 118 S.W. at 87.
83. 219 Mo. at 197, 118 S.W. at 95 (Lamm, J., dissenting). "I do not
hesitate to say that the unregulated, arbitrary whimsical power to fine or im-
prison for contempt, a power that will not brook a mere temperate and
reasonable control, is contrary to the genius of our institutions and the policy of
our Constitution and statutes." Id.
84. Id. at 200-01, 118 S.W. at 95-96 (Lamm,J., dissenting). The rule would
have been stated by the dissenters as follows: (1) the court does have inherent
1981]
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unanswerable; 85 three years later, both Shepherd and Gildersleeve were
overruled in Ex parte Creasy. 8
The uncertainty these cases created about the power of the courts over
attorneys became readily apparent the year following Creasy in State ex
rel. Selleck v. Reynolds.87 Ellroy V. Selleck was charged in the St. Louis
Court of Appeals by the St. Louis Bar Association with multiple counts of
misconduct, 88 two of which were substantiated 9 by extensive evidence 0
before two court-appointed special commissioners. Under one charge,
Selleck was found to have instructed another to "give false and perjured
testimony," and that such testimony had been given. 9' Under the other,
the commissioners found that Selleck had converted a deceased client's
notes and deeds of trust. 92 Despite the absence of a criminal conviction for
power to punish for contempt and cannot be stripped of such power; (2) the
legislature may regulate the power to punish for contempt in order to protect
against an abuse of discretion; (3) the punishment statute is such a reasonable
regulation; and (4) such regulation does not destroy the power of the court. Id. at
200-01, 118 S.W. at 96.
85. Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 708, 148 S.W. 914, 923 (En Banc 1912).
86. 243 Mo. 679, 708, 148 S.W. 914, 923 (En Banc 1912). Creasy was a
habeas corpus proceeding brought by one adjudged guilty of contempt for
willfully failing to cooperate with a grand jury. Id. at 684, 688, 148 S.W. at 915,
916. The punishment was a six month jail term. Id. at 681, 148 S.W. at 921.
Judge Graves, writing for the court, stated, "To my mind the sooner some of the
broad doctrine of both the Shepherd and Gildersleeve cases is overruled, the bet-
ter it will be for the jurisprudence of the State." Id. at 708, 148 S.W. at 913. The
court then adopted the dissenting opinion in Gildersleeve. Id.
87. 252 Mo. 369, 158 S.W. 671 (En Banc 1913).
88. In re Selleck, 168 Mo. App. 391, 391-95, 151 S.W. 743, 743-44 (St. L.
1912),judgment quashed, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S.W. 671 (En Banc 1913).
89. 168 Mo. App. at 392-97, 151 S.W. at 743-44.
90. Id. at 398-99, 151 S.W. at 745. The commissioners heard the matter for
18 days, listened to 85 witnesses, and compiled 4 volumes of record containing
1,843 pages, together with a further volume of documents. Id. at 392, 151 S.W.
at 743.
91. Id. at 394-95, 151 S.W. at 744. Selleck had been an attorney for Bertha
Henkel, who was employed by Charles Kotzaurek, the owner of two hat stores in
St. Louis. Kotzaurek had numerous debts for rent and inventory. Through
Henkel, Kotzaurek met Selleck and a scheme was devised to transfer, on paper,
the business from Kotzaurek to Henkel. Id. at 395, 151 S.W. at 744. Implicit in
the report of commissioners was that the scheme was intended to defraud
creditors. Bertha Henkel was alleged to have been "directed and instructed" to
give false testimony in litigation arising out of the purported sale. Id.
92. Id. at 395-97, 151 S.W. at 744-45. Selleck was found to have represented
John Link, who had owned certain notes for debtors secured by deeds of trust.
Following Link's death and before letters testamentary were issued to Link's
widow, Selleck impersonated Link, entered Link's safety deposit box, and took
the notes and deeds of trust, converting them to his own use and refusing to
account to the estate for them. He later alleged that one note and the deed secur-
14
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the action, the court of appeals found lawyer misconduct and disbarred
Selleck. 93
Selleck appealed to the supreme court, which quashed the disbar-
ment.9 4 In a three judge plurality, Judge Graves compared the proceedings
to disbar to the power to punish for contempt as outlined in Shepherd,
Gildersleeve, and Greasy.95 As a result, Judge Graves agreed that the
legislature could control any inherent power the court might have over at-
torney discipline.9 6 Because Selleck's actions, if true, would support an in-
dictment for a criminal offense 97 and because there had been no indict-
ment, the court of appeals under the disbarment statute had no power to
disbar Selleck. 9s
Three judges dissented. While concurring with Judge Graves that in-
herent power did exist and that the legislature could regulate it, Chief
Justice Lamm found that any regulation that would prevent disciplinary
action in this situation would be unreasonable. 99 Judge Woodson carried
this dissent further, holding that legislative pronouncements in the disbar-
ment area were only attempted codifications of the common law inherent
power and that the legislative enactments could neither create any power
ing it had been transferred to him prior to Link's death. The commissioner found
this allegation by Selleck to be false. Id. at 396-97, 151 S.W. at 744-45.
93. Id. at 398-99, 151 S.W. at 745.
94. 252 Mo. at 374, 158 S.W. at 671.
95. Id. at 379-80, 158 S.W. at 673. "Contempt and disbarment proceedings
are kindred spirits. Both have in view the protection of the courts." Id. at 380, 158
S.W. at 673.
96. Id. at 380, 158 S.W. at 673. Judge Graves wrote, "The statutes of
Missouri in disbarment proceedings, as in contempt proceedings, have re-
cognized the right of the courts to act, but such statutes have placed limitations
upon this inherent power, and the judgment in the instance case goes beyond the
statutory limitations, and is therefore bad." Id. The statutes themselves were
found to be reasonable. Id. at 382-83, 158 S.W. at 674. Judge Graves stated that
preconviction disbarment "brands... [Selleck] as a felon, and this without a trial
by jury." Id. at 384, 158 S.W. at 674-75. It was not, therefore, unreasonable for
the legislature to prevent disbarment for indictable offenses until after a jury had
spoken. Id. at 384, 158 S.W. at 675.
97. Id. at 381, 158 S.W. at 674.
98. Id. at 386, 158 S.W. at 675.
99. Id. at 408, 158 S.W. at 682 (Lamm, C.J., dissenting). Lamm agreed
with Gildersleeve that the legislature's "power to regulate is not the power to
destroy." Id. at 407, 158 S.W. at 682 (Lamm, C.J., dissenting). He wrote,
however:
[T]hat a court has the inherent power to disbar an attorney and that the
lawmaker can pass laws regulative of that power, which permits the
court to disbar for light offenses whilst at the same time denying the
power to disbar for dark and heavy offenses except on the condition
precedent of conviction, is not to my mind reasonable.
Id. (Lamm, C.J., dissenting).
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nor limit any inherent power held by the court. 100 The power existed, ac-
cording to Judge Woodson, inherently and independent of any legislative
enactments, as "essential to the administration of justice."'' Judge
Walker joined the dissents of both Chief Justice Lamm and Judge Wood-
son. 10 2 Judge Brown cast the swing vote. He rejected the inherent power
argument and argued that the power of the court was nothing more than
implied, and as implied power it could go no further than legislation per-
mitted. 0 3
Following Selleck, all views on the issue of inherent power were pre-
sent. The court stood six to one in favor of some inherent power in the court
in disbarment matters. The scope of that power, however, was unclear:
three judges agreed that the legislature could restrict the power in disbar-
ment proceedings, one judge agreed that the legislature could restrict the
power but that this restriction was unreasonable, one judge believed that
the legislature had no power to restrict inherent power, one judge agreed
with both of the latter two viewpoints, and one judge believed that there
was no inherent power. What emerges from Selleck, albeit with dissent, is
a determination by the court that the legislature, which represents the
people, has the power to control the practice of law, a public profession.
The organized bar reacted immediately to the anti-consumer effect of
Selleck, which was to "put it out of the power of our courts to disbar an at-
torney charged with an indictible offense, except upon the condition
precedent of conviction,' 0 4 calling it an absurd situation.0 5 The bar was
beginning to assert an absence of public concern by the legislature, yet the
task of reform was still to the legislature, which provided some relief on
May 30, 1919, when thirteen sections of the revised statutes of 1909 were
abolished in favor of new sections relating to the disciplining of
100. Id. at 406-07, 158 S.W. at 680 (Woodson, J., dissenting). In England,
according to Judge Woodson, the courts "from time where the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary, have entertained jurisdiction of disbarment pro-
ceedings, and have disbarred attorneys and counselors at law, without any
statutory authority." Id. at 406, 158 S.W. at 680 (Woodson, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at406, 158 S.W. at 680 (Woodson,J., dissenting). "[T]he statutes of
the various States are merely regulative of that power, and are not the creation of
it." Id. (Woodson, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 407, 409, 158 S.W. at 681, 683 (Woodson, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 387, 158 S.W. at 681 (Brown, J., concurring). According tojudge
Brown, "[i]f courts have inherent powers, then their jurisdiction has no definite
bounds. It is only one short step from the assertion of inherent power to the
assumption of absolute power." Id. Judge Brown agreed that English courts had
inherent power, stating that the legislative and executive branches had it as well
and that it was this "inherent, arbitrary and often tyrannical power" that
precipitated the American Revolution. Id.
104. 1914 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 81-82. The committee recommended legis-
lation correcting the problem. Id.
105. Id.
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attorneys. 106
The statute's first change expanded the power to discipline to include
not only the prior statutory grounds of criminal conviction and defalcation
of client's money, but also guilt "of any malpractice, fraud, deceit or
misdemeanor whatsoever in his professional capacity."1 07 The addition of
the word "whatsoever" could have indicated that the legislature intended
to increase the power of the court in the Selleck-type case.
Another section of the statute went even further in expanding the
power of the court. While retaining summary proceedings for charges
based on conviction of a crime, the law provided for a trial when charges
were brought for conduct other than a criminal conviction, even if "the at-
torney be acquitted or discharged upon his [criminal] trial."'0 8
Following these legislative changes, the inherent power issue first arose
in In re Sizer,'0 9 where the original charges were filed with the supreme
court." 0 Arguing that the state constitution gave the supreme court ap-
pellate jurisdiction only, the attorneys moved to dismiss the charges
against them."' Chief Justice Woodson, although expressing his personal
dislike for the proposition, found that inherent power conferred original
jurisdiction on the court to supervise inferior courts and thus gave rise to
the power to disbar in certain cases." 2 When Sizer was heard later on the
106. 1919 Mo. Laws 151.
107. Id. at 152, § 951. The same section also make it an offense to fail to
disclose, on application for Missouri bar admission, removal or disbarment in
another jurisdiction. Id.
108. Id. at 152-53, § 956 (emphasis added). Charges in disciplinary matters
under the 1919 revisions had to be "in writing and verified." The charges could be
filed by an attorney or by a judge. The supreme court, the courts of appeals, and
the circuit courts were authorized to hear ethics matters. See id. at 152, § 952.
When charges were filed, the court fixed a hearing date and ordered a copy of the
charge served on the attorney-respondent. Id. §§ 953-954. If, on the return date,
summons had been served on the respondent and respondent failed to appear, the
hearing court was permitted to proceed ex parte. Id. § 955. The statute also per-
mitted commissioners to hear the matter and report findings to the court. See id.
at 953, § 957. Appeals from disbarment proceedings were made directly to the
supreme court, by error, and the court was directed to hear speedily such matters
"at the next term of said court unless continued for cause." Id. § 958. Finally, if a
lawyer was suspended for more than one year, application for reinstatement had
to be made to the court that originally heard the matter. Id. § 959.
109. 300 Mo. 369, 254 S.W. 82 (En Banc 1923).
110. Id. at 374, 254 S.W. at 82.
111. Id. The charges were filed against F.P. Sizer and H.A. Gardner. The
substance of the motion was that the jurisdiction of the supreme court was limited
to appellate jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided for in the constitution. Id. at
376, 254 S.W. at 83.
112. Id. at 377, 254 S.W. at 83. The argument was that the court had
original jurisdiction to supervise inferior courts, with the legislature powerless to
limit such power. Id.
1981]
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merits, Chief Justice Graves noted that the 1919 statutory revisions ap-
parently were designed to "cure the troubles suggested in Selleck's case."" 3
As can be seen from Sizer, even the most vigorous advocates of in-
herent power in Selleck were willing to accede to legislative control over the
practice of law. Thus, Sizer stands only for the proposition that the
supreme court has inherent original jurisdiction to hear disbarment cases,
but not inherent power to increase beyond legislative pronouncement the
types of conduct that would sustain a disbarment action. Sizer, however,
did not foreclose the use of inherent power.
Events during succeeding years caused the court to re-examine its posi-
tion on inherent power and on the need to exercise it to protect the public.
To a large extent, those events were set in motion by the bar of Missouri.
Consequently, it is necessary to review the role of the bar association in the
creation of disciplinary rules for lawyers.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION
The Missouri Bar Association, a voluntary organization, was formed
at a meeting in Kansas City on December 29, 1880, by passage of a con-
stitution and bylaws." 4 The initial constitution called for a standing com-
mittee on grievances, 15 which later became the Committee on Ethics and
Grievances.' 16 The role of the early grievance committee was undefined at
least until 1907, when the committee recognized, although refused to ac-
113. In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 369, 267 S.W. 922, 926 (En Banc 1924). The
charges against Sizer and Gardner stemmed from their personal injury business
and involved the use of paid agents to solicit personal injury claims as well as other
alleged misdeeds in soliciting and representing personal injury clients. Id. at
366-68, 267 S.W. at 925. After discussing all of the charges, the court found an
absence of proof and all charges were dismissed. Id. at 391, 267 S.W. at 934.
Gardner, however, was later suspended for one year for paying agents to solicit
personal injury cases. See In re Gardner, 232 Mo. App. 502, 119 S.W.2d 50 (Spr.
1938).
114. See 1881 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 23-27. The constitution and bylaws of
the association were printed at id. 60-66. The secretary reported that Missouri
was not alone in organizing its bar as "throughout the United States, State Bar
Associations... [were] being organized... in the interest of the profession and
the public at large," and that considerable interest was being shown in the efforts
of the Missouri bar. Id. at 27. Membership in the bar association was organized
by circuits. Id. at 60-61. See generally Oliver, The Story of the Missouri Bar,
1880-1965, 32J. Mo. B. 378 (1976).
115. 1881 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 24-25.
116. This change occurred sometime at or around the thirty-fifth annual
meeting of the association, in 1917. The committee report that year was given as
the "Report of Committee on Grievances." 1917 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 86. The
constitution of the association for that year, however, lists, for the first time, the
committee as the "Committee on Grievances and Legal Ethics." Id. at 20.
[Vol. 46726
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cept, that part of its duties included investigating ethics matters., 7 This is
not to say that the bar did not recognize its role in ensuring competence of
its members. Beginning in 1900, the bar attempted to induce legislative
action, through its legal education committee, on a bill to redefine the re-
quirements for admission to practice and to require that applications for
admission be controlled by a board of bar examiners.,, The bar's efforts,
finally successful in the 1905 legislative session, 119 prompted the education
committee to recommend to the 1906 bar association meeting the adop-
tion of formal ethical guidelines for members of the association. 120
117. That the effectiveness of the committee was open to question can be seen
from two of the committee's reports. The 1905 committee report begins as
follows: "First, we do not... [know] what kind, or kinds, of Grievances this Com-
mittee should take cognizance of, and have been unable to find anyone who does
know." 1905 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 66. The committee reported that it asked the
president of the association to define the committee's function and received the
following reply from President John D. Lawson:
I really do not know exactly what the duties are of the Committee on
Grievances, but the Constitution of the Association requires the Presi-
dent to appoint such a committee and that that committee shall present
an annual report to the Association, so I have thrown the burden of the
matter on you.
Id. at 68.
By 1907, it was clear that the committee was aware that its charge included in-
vestigations of violations of ethical obligations. See 1907 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS
36. In 1907, the committee met only by correspondence and found no grievances
in any of the committees in the counties wherein the committee members resided.
Id. at 35-36. It was the opinion of the group that any grievances which did occur
were better handled by the local bar association than by the state bar. Id. at
35-36.
118. See 1900 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 22. There were two objectives: the first
was to bring the power of admission under the control of the supreme court, and
the second was the appointment, by the court, of a commission to monitor admis-
sion. Id. The idea had first been proposed at the 1899 meeting. Id. at 20-21. It
was in 1900 that the first legislation was introduced; the bill was never considered
by the Missouri House, however. Id. at 22. The 1900 bar meeting appointed a
committee to redraft the legislation for presentation to the next general assembly.
Id. at 22, 27.
119. 1906 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 27. See also 1905 Mo. Laws 48.
120. See 1906 MO. B. PROCEEDINGS 29. It was noted that the bar examiners
tested applicants on legal ethics. Compare id. with 1905 Mo. Laws 48, § 6. Conse-
quently, the bar examiners needed an ethics code and found one in Alabama. See
1906 MO. B. PROCEEDINGS 29. That code had been the first in the country, hav-
ing been adopted on December 14, 1887. See 31 A.B.A. REP. 676 (1907). The
Alabama code served as the basis for all other ethics codes then existing. Id. at
685. The principal drafter of the Alabama code was Judge Thomas G. Jones of
Alabama. 33 A.B.A. REP. 567 (1908). The legal education committee recom-
mended the adoption of this code for the Missouri bar, and the recommendation
was accepted by the membership. 1906 MO. B. PROCEEDINGS 30, 42. The entire
code is printed at id. at 31-41.
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As a result, the Missouri Bar Association in 1906 became the eleventh
state bar association in the nation to adopt a code of professional conduct
for attorneys, a code identical to the nation's first formal ethics code,
adopted in Alabama in 1887.121 That code remained in force for the bar
association's members until 1914 when the bar adopted the Canons of
Ethics, which had been adopted in 1908 by the American Bar
Association. 122
It was not until thirteen years after the Selleck decision, however, in
1925, that the bar association made its first real efforts to institute formal
regulation for members of the bar. The 1925 report of the Committee on
Grievances and Legal Ethics stated:
In recent years a number of the states in the Union, by
legislative enactment, have undertaken with a considerable degree
of success to define what might be considered to be ethical or
unethical practices by lawyers. In most instances these legislative
enactments declare as illegal certain practices, and make such
unethical practices grounds for disbarment. 123
As a result of this statement, the committee recommended the appoint-
ment of a special committee to study this legislation, recognizing that any
recommendations for adoption of lawyer disciplinary regulations ought to
be made to the Missouri legislature.124 At the same time, however, the
committee noted its dissatisfaction with the ability of the legislative process
effectively to ensure ethical competence.
While the bar had been successful in having the 1905 statute adopted,
the bar also recognized that its relationship with the legislature was poor.
In assessing the chances for passage of any recommendations to be made
by this special committee, the association stated:
121. See note 120 supra.
122. See 1913 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 26-37. The recommendation was made
to the bar by the Constitutional and Statutory Revision Committee. Id. at 26.
The ABA had appointed its first committee to study a proposed code of ethics in
1905. See 31 A.B.A. REP. 63 (1907). By 1906, the committee reported that a code
was both advisable and practical. See id. at 681, 684. At the 1907 meeting, the
committee was directed to prepare a proposed code by May 1, 1908. See id. at 64.
At this time the committee included a Missourian, Franklin Ferriss. See id. at
680. Ferriss was a member of tne Missouri Bar Association. See 1907 Mo. B. PRO-
CEEDINGS 300. The debate on the committee's proposal at the 1908 meeting in
Seattle was considerable. See 33 A.B.A. REP. 55-86 (1908). In the end, the 32
canons proposed by the committee were adopted as written, with one exception.
The canon on contingent fees was rewritten by the membership. See id. at 55-86,
574-84. Franklin Ferriss was on the final committee. See id. at 573.
123. 1925 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 54.
124. Id. The list of committees of the Missouri Bar Association for 1925-1926
recognizes that such a committee was adopted. See id. at viii.
728 [Vol. 46
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The Legislature gave scant consideration to meritorious bills
sponsored by the St. Louis Bar Association, intended to correct
unethical practices among lawyers in Missouri. The legislative
conscience seems hardly awakened to the need of remedial mea-
sures of this kind, and to the fact that the public generally is, or
ought to be, profoundly interested in the elimination of unethical
methods practiced by some lawyers.1 2
5
The special committee reported back to the bar association at the 1926
annual meeting.1 26 The committee noted that sixteen states already had
prescribed by statute the conduct of lawyers. These statutes conformed "in
the main" with the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association.
127
The conclusion of the committee was "that a code of professional ethics be
enacted by the Legislature of the State of Missouri, embodying or based
upon" the ABA Canons. 128 Mere enactment of the canons, however, was
not sufficient to compel adherence to them. Thus, the committee further
recommended that the canons "should be rigidly, impartially, fearlessly
and vigorously upheld and supported by state bar associations and bench
and bar alike.1 1
29
By 1928, despite the urging of the bar, the legislature had done
nothing. Frustration among the members of the bar association was grow-
ing. At the annual meeting, Boyle G. Clark, chairman of the bar's ethics
and grievance committee, noted that the committee "has had complaint
after complaint come before it. In view of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of this state, we could do nothing."1 30 Clark explained that the pur-
pose of the prior special committee was to seek a solution to this inability to
act, concluding, "nothing can be done unless we get some legislation.''
At this time, the ethics and grievance committee of the bar association
also was uncertain whether its duties included investigating offenses only
125. Id. at 104.
126. See 1926 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 27.
127. See id. at 28. The states which had so enacted legislation, according to
the committee, were Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Washington. Id.
128. Id. at 30. The committee directed its attention not only to what it termed
the "ambulance chaser," but also to "those who profess to live upon the higher
planes of professional ethics." Id. at 29-30. These lawyers were those who sought
"to advertise their prowess and achievements" through active participation in
social, club, and civic activities. Id. at 30. The committee also condemned
nonlawyer practice of law, such as situations where title companies reviewed their
own and other companies' abstracts, and where trust companies prepared wills
naming the trust company as executor. Id. at 29.
129. Id. at 30.
130. 1928 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 89.
131. Id.
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of members of the association, 132 a group that was estimated in 1930 to in-
clude only about one quarter of the practicing lawyers in the state, or
whether it was to investigate offenses by others as well. 3 3 The committee
had investigated nonmembers as early as 1917. This role, however, was
unofficial and thus, in 1930, in an effort to further protect the public, the
committee was authorized to act in all cases of lawyer misconduct,
regardless of the association membership of the offending lawyer. ' 3 4
Th6 year 1930 also marked the beginning of a concerted effort to inte-
grate the Missouri Bar Association. 35 Indeed, the 1930 meeting of the
association authorized a committee to investigate fully the incorporation
of the bar association. 136 The committee found that, although legal prob-
lems prevented incorporation, the legislature could create a corporate-like
entity known as the State Bar of Missouri. 137"A bill to this effect was intro-
duced, but was not enacted, in the 1931 legislature,' 38 causing the bar to
recommend concerted action in the 1933 legislative session. ' 9
132. See, e.g., 1929 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 38 (committee believed it should
investigate all complaints, regardless of association membership); 1930 Mo. B.
PROCEEDINGS 123 (committee adopted same policy, but recognized difficulties in
such policy).
133. See Reorganization ofMissouri Bar Association, 1 MO. B.J., Nov. 1930,
at 3. At the time, there were approximately 6,500 lawyers in the state, about
1,700 of whom were association members. Id.
134. See 1930 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 124. Prior to this time, the ethics and
grievance committees had been investigating other nonassociation members of
the bar, but on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., 1917 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 86. The
committee members investigated as "citizen lawyers" rather than through any
official sanction, id. at 87, although the association, in 1917, did allow the com-
mittee a budget of $300 per year to do whatever was necessary to purge "the pro-
fession of practitioners engaged in unlawful or unethical methods." See id. at 89.
See also note 132 supra.
135. See Reorganization of Missouri Bar Association, supra note 133. The
president of the association, J.W. Jamison, prepared several revisions to the con-
stitution of the bar association designed to reorganize the bar. Id. at 3-4.
136. 1930 Mo. B. PROCEEDINGS 73-74.
137. 1931 Report of Special Committee on the Incorporation of the Bar, 3
MO. B.J., Jan. 1932, at 6.
138. Id. The reasons given by the committee for the failure of the bill were
that'the matter was too new and that other legislation was more urgent. See id.
139. Id. A bill already had been proposed. During this time, the bar re-
mained active, both in internal reorganization and in ethical matters. A new con-
stitution for the bar association designed to affiliate local bars into the Missouri
bar was adopted in 1931. See Affiliated Bar Plan Becomes Effective, 2 MO. B.J.,
Dec. 1931, at 3. The new constitution encompassed proposals made by President
Jamison in 1930. Compare Constitution of Missouri Bar Association, 2 MO. B.J.,
Dec. 1931, at 64 with Reorganization of the Missouri Bar Association, supra note
131.
In addition, President Jamison called a symposium to determine an "orderly
and business-like plan for the handling of proper complaints against attorneys
[Vol. 46730
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/1
LA WYER DISCIPLINE IN MISSOURI
Although incorporation was self-interest legislation for the still volun-
tary bar, the proposed bill was public-oriented. When the bar was fully in-
tegrated, the association could work effectively with the court in drafting
rules of professional conduct and could aid the court in protecting the
public by enforcing those rules. 140 As drafted by the association, a unified
bar act was introduced in the Missouri House onJanuary 18, 1933. 141 Con-
and their methods." A Symposium on Disbarment Proceedings, 2 MO. BJ., June
1931, at 6. That symposium had, as one of its issues, whether courts had "in-
herent power [to discipline] based upon unworthy conduct entirely aside from the
Statute." Id. For a composite of those discussions, see Lawson, Leahy &
McReynolds, Disbarment-A Legislative orJudicial Power. The Cannon Case, 3
MO. B.J. 39 (1932). Those in the symposium found, in Missouri, only inherent
power subject to legislative regulation. Id. at 46. This seemed illogical. "[E]ither
the legislature has the authority to limit and define the conditions upon which
lawyers can be disbarred, or they do not have the authority." Id. Thus, a resolu-
tion was adopted requesting the supreme court to adopt an ethics code and en-
force it. Id. at 46-47.
140. See Preliminary Report of Committee on Proposed Incorporation or
Integration of the Missouri Bar, 3 MO. B.J. 54 (1932). To fund the organization
for discipline of the bar, the committee recommended that the legislature charge
the members of the profession. Id.
At this time, nine states had adopted integrated bar organizations: Alabama,
1923; California, 1927; Idaho, 1923; Nevada, 1928; New Mexico, 1925; North
Dakota, 1921; Oklahoma, 1929; South Dakota, 1931; Utah, 1931. Barker, Pro-
gress in Bar Organizations, 3 MO. B.J. 52, 53 (1932). Bills for bar integration had
passed legislatures in Arizona and Wyoming in 1931, but were vetoed by the
governors. Id. Unsuccessful bills had been introduced in Missouri, Ohio, and
Texas. Id. Bills were to be introduced in 1932 in Kentucky, Mississippi, and
Virginia, and bills were expected to be sought in 1933 in Minnesota, Oregon, and
Washington. Id.
141. See Bar Act Fails by Narrow Margin, 4 MO. B.J. 35 (1933). The
prepared act contained 33 sections. Sections 1-13 dealt with the title of the act,
mechanics of the organization, membership, officers, and duties. See Proposed
Bill on Self-Government of the Bar, 3 Mo. B.J., Nov. 1932, Supplement, at 1-10.
Section 14 authorized the supreme court to adopt rules of professional conduct.
Id. at 10. Sections 15 and 16 created a local administrative committee in each cir-
cuit and provided for the duties of the committees, including the preliminary and
investigative work for the State Board of Governors in disciplinary matters. Id. at
11-13. Sections 17-20 provided a procedure for disciplinary matters, including
venue, notice and right to respond to charges, a procedure for discovery, sub-
poenas of witnesses, and powers of the board in disciplinary matters. Id. at 13-18.
Sections 21, 22, and 25-28 were administrative. Id. at 18, 20-21. Section 23 pro-
vided for a mandatory yearly fee of $5 per member, and section 24 provided for
mandatory and automatic suspension from practice for failure to pay that fee. Id.
at 18-20. Sections 29 and 30 related to the unauthorized practice of law, and sec-
tion 31 gave the supreme court control over the bar. Id. at 21-22.
Some changes in these provisions were made by the Judiciary Committee. See




Devine: Devine: Lawyer Discipline in Missouri:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
trary to the optimism of the bar, the bill failed. 142 A similar bill in the
Senate met the same fate. 143 The legislative move for bar integration and
ethics rules was dead. 144
Undaunted, the bar association, in the same issue of the Missouri Bar
Journal that mourned the death of the legislation, planted the seed of a
new idea for public protection,145 which was more fully explained in a
May 1933 article:
If the courts have inherent power to deal with the erring
lawyer, as an officer of the court; if the proceeding is not criminal;
if the result is not punishment, but for the protection of the court
and society; and if the method of inquiry is not technical, then it
would seem to follow that the courts may proceed in such manner
as to them seems best adapted to develop the facts. 146
142. See Bar Act Fails by Narrow Margin, supra note 141, at 35-37. The bill
fell seven votes short of passage with an additional two supporters of the bill
changing their votes to "no" at the last minute so they could later seek recon-
sideration. Id. at 37-38. On reconsideration, opposition, mainly from St. Louis,
caused the bill to fail again. Id. at 38. An analysis of the vote showed the follow-
ing:
YES NO ABSENT TOTAL
St. Louis City 1 13 5 19
Jackson County (Kansas City) 4 2 4 10
Buchanan County (St. Joseph) 2 1 0 3
Greene County (Springfield) 2 0 1 3
Jasper County (Joplin) 3 0 0 3
"Out State" 59 31 22 112
Total 71 47 32 150
Id. at 39. While 32 votes are recorded as absent, observers of the vote noted that
"[njot more than a half dozen were actually absent," and that when the members
were called to vote, "these 32 sat in their seats and did not answer the roll call."
Id. at 38.
143. Id. at 38. The Senate bill was a duplicate of the House substitute bill and
was introduced when opposition began to arise in the House. Id.
144. Publicity, both too much and too little, may have caused the vote to turn
out as it did. According to the floor leader of the House, many lawyers in the state
actually were opposed only to the original bar bill. To many of those, however,
the committee substitute bill would have been acceptable. Those lawyers knew
only about the original bill. The actual provisions of the substitute were not
known outside the legislature. If the provisions of the substitute had been
publicized, many of those opposed "would have supported the Substitute Act and
would have written their representatives to that effect." Keating, The Defeat of
the Bar Bill, 4 MO. B.J. 83, 83 (1933).
145. See Bar Integration Through Supreme Court Rule, 4 Mo. Bj. 45
(1933). The article hypothesized that a supreme court could organize the bar as
part of superintendent control over admission and discipline of the bar. See id.
146. Lawson, Regulation of the Bar by the Supreme Court of Missouri, 4
MO. B.J. 67, 68 (1933). The article referred to action by the Illinois Supreme
[Vol. 46
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The stage was set for the development of court rules through inherent
power.
V. ISSUE AND ANSWER JOINED
In In re Richards, 147 Paul Richards was charged in an original pro-
ceeding for disbarment in the supreme court with multiple counts of
unethical conduct by both the St. Louis Bar Association and the Missouri
Bar Association. 14 It was alleged that Richards had accepted a retainer of
$1,000 from Alexander Berg while Berg was held hostage by kidnap-
pers. 49 At the time he accepted the retainer, Richards alledgedly already
had been retained by the kidnappers and informed that the kidnappers
would force Berg to give Richards the retainer together with a promissory
note for an additional $50,000, which would be payable to Richards.'"
Richards was to collect on the note, which was in fact the ransom, for the
kidnappers and would thereafter be entitled to retain $10,000 from the
$50,000 for his efforts.' 5' Richards accepted the retainer through Berg's
personal attorney. 52 As alleged in the complaint against him, Richards
then used his ostensible position as attorney for Berg to further the plans of
his real clients, the kidnappers.153 Although Richards never received any
of the ransom and Berg was returned safely to his family, 5 4 Richards was
Court which had, on April 21, 1933, ruled that the grievance committees of both
the Illinois and Chicago bar associations had investigative and limited
disciplinary enforcement power. See id.; Voluntary Bar Association of Illinois
Secures Powers of An Incorporated Bar, 4 MO. B.J. 69 (1933). The title is not
quite accurate as the power was limited only to disciplinary matters.
147. 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (En Banc 1933).
148. Id. at 910, 63 S.W.2d at 672-73.
149. Id. at 918, 63 S.W.2d at 677. The retainer was for Richards to act as an
intermediary between Berg and the kidnappers.
Alexander Berg was a St. Louis fur dealer. Shortly after leaving his business,
Berg was accosted at gunpoint by Edward Barcume and Charles Heuer, who
forced Berg's chauffeur to drive where they directed. See State v. Peak, 68
S.W.2d 701, 702 (Mo. 1934). Berg eventually was taken to an apartment in St.
Louis and was forced by his captors to write several letters. Berg was directed to
write to Morris Levinson, his personal attorney, to hire Richards for a retainer of
$1,000 to act as Berg's attorney for obtaining his release. Later, Berg was re-
quired to write a promissory note to Richards' order for $50,000, which was the
amount of ransom demanded. Richards ostensibly arranged Berg's release on the
condition that Richards receive the $50,000 the day following Berg's release. Pay-
ment was prevented, however, because attorney Levinson kept the police in-
formed, and all of the participants, including Richards, were arrested shortly
following Berg's release. Id.
150. 68 S.W.2d at 702. See also 333 Mo. at 918, 63 S.W.2d at 677.
151. 333 Mo. at 918, 63 S.W.2d at 677.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 68 S.W.2d at 702.
1981]
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indicted for kidnapping, tried, and acquitted. 55
In responding to the ethics complaint against him, Richards first
moved to dismiss the charge on jurisdicational grounds, and then alleged
by answer that the court had no authority to hear the case because, in light
of Selleck, the acquittal of the criminal charge resolved the ethics
matter. 15 The bar associations vigorously prosecuted the matter because
the conduct of Richards brought "reproach upon... [the] profession and
•.. [alienated] the favorable opinion the public should entertain concern-
ing it. ' 157
In Richards, the supreme court had an opportunity to re-examine
many issues considered in Selleck.158 The principal issues were the extent
of the court's inherent power and whether that power permitted the-court
to discipline attorneys for the same transaction that already had resulted in
a criminal acquittal. 5 9
The motion to dismiss was premised on the argument that the supreme
court, both constitutionally and statutorily, possessed only appellate
jurisdiction and thus had no power to hear this orginal matter. This mo-
tion caused the court to begin its discussion with the inherent power issue,
noting that Selleck had granted some inherent power to the court, but that
the extent of that power was unclear.160 Next, the court cited the opinions
of several scholars and decisions of more than twenty states, the federal
courts, and the United States Supreme Court that supported a theory of in-
herent power in disciplinary matters.16' After noting several Missouri deci-
sions that seemed to favor inherent power, 6 2 the court stated the argu-
ment in opposition to inherent power:
[I]n the distribution of state governmental power, executive
and judicial departments are invested by grant, whereas, by limit-
ations placed on the legislative department, the people reserve cer-
tain power to themselves, so that all governmental power not thus
expressly granted or reserved is vested in the Legislature. From this
155. 333 Mo. at 919, 63 S.W.2d at 678. It would be determined later that one
reason for Richards' acquittal may have been the bribery of a juror in the
criminal case by Richards' trial attorney, Verne Lacy. Lacy subsequently was
disbarred, in part, because of his conduct. See In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 74,
112 S.W.2d 594, 595 (St. L. 1937).
156. 333 Mo. at 910, 919, 63 S.W.2d at 673, 678.
157. 333 Mo. at 909 (argument in Brief for Complainants).
158. For a discussion of Selleck and the response of the bar and the
legislature, see notes 87-108 and accompanying text supra.
159. Richards assumed that the facts underlying the indictment and the facts
supporting the disciplinary information were the same. 333 Mo. at 920, 63
S.W.2d at 678.
160. Id. at 911, 63 S.W.2d at 673.
161. Id. at 912-14, 63 S.W.2d at 674-75.
162. Id. at 913-14, 63 S.W.2d at 674-75.
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it is argued that, if the power to create and regulate a bar is not
granted to the judicial department or reserved to the people by
limitation on the legislative department, it is vested in the Legisla-
ture, and that, all judicial power being granted power, it is deriva-
tive and cannot be inherent. 163
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the constitution vested
all legislative power in the legislature and all judicial power in the constitu-
tional courts of the state.16 4 Thus, even absent express power, both the
legislature and the courts had to have some inherent power to carry out
"all objects naturally within the orbit of tlat department.' ' 65 Under this
rationale, the issues would turn on whether the power to disbar was within
the orbit of things necessary to carry out the power of the judicial depart-
ment. 66 Thus stated, the court easily answered the question by finding
that the proper administration of justice "cannot long continue . . .
without power to admit and disbar attorneys who from time immemorial
have in a peculiar sense been regarded as . . . [the court's] officers.'1 6 7
This finding left unanswered only the issue of whether the inherent
power to admit or disbar was constitutionally or statutorily limited,'"6 an
issue that had split the six justices who were in favor of the existence of in-
herent power in Selleck. 169 The principal argument in favor of this limita-
tion on inherent power arose, said the court, because disbarment pro-
ceedings were thought adversarial, akin to traditional court proceed-
ings. 170 Rejection of the argument came through a recitation of the line of
cases holding exactly the reverse. These cases held that the proceedings
were not adversarial and that the purpose was not punishment of the at-
torney but protection of the public. The court declared that nothing in the
nature of the disbarment proceeding substantively limited the court. 17
The court stated, "The vital fact is that such power, independent of ex-
press grant either constitutional or statutory, exists in the judicial branch
of government, and therefore in courts which constitute the 'separate
magistracy' to which the judicial power is expressly confided." 72 Richards'
motion to dismiss the complaint was denied. 173
In his answer, Richards had alleged that he could not be disciplined




167. Id. at 915, 63 S.W.2d at 675.
168. Id.
169. See notes 95-103 and accompanying text supra.
170. 333 Mo. at 915, 63 S.W.2d at 675.
171. Id. at 915-16, 63 S.W.2d at 676.
172. Id. at 916, 63 S.W.2d at 676.
173. Id. at 917-18, 63 S.W.2d at 677.
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for criminal acts without a criminal conviction. 1 74 The court recognized
that Selleck had held that the findings of a criminal court were binding on
the court hearing a disbarment proceeding, but it then stated, "The
fallacy of this majority holding was clearly indicated in two dissenting
opinions.' 175 The court referred to the enactment of the 1919 statute,
which permitted a disciplinary charge even after acquittal in a criminal
matter. This statute, according to the court, "removed the excuse for [the]
judicial aberration" of the Selleck majority. 76 Thus, even with an acquit-
tal, an attorney could be charged in a disbarment proceeding with acts
amounting to "a misdemeanor and malpractice in his professional capaci-
ty."1 77 Richards' conduct fit this category; consequently, he was
disbarred.178
174. Id. at 919-20, 63 S.W.2d at 678. The respondent claimed that
the complaint in effect charged him with a "criminal offense involving
moral turpitude," conviction of which is the first reason for disbarment
named in the statute, and that, having been acquitted on such a criminal
charge based on the same acts, such acts may not be charged and moved
as reasons for his disbarment.
Id. at 920, 63 S.W.2d at 678.
175. Id. at 921, 63 S.W.2d at 679.
176. See id. The court went further by indicating affirmatively that any
statute which prevented disciplinary investigation following criminal acquittal
would be unconstitutional as a legislative encroachment on the power of the
judiciary. Id.
177. Id. at 920, 63 S.W.2d at 678.
178. Id. at 931, 63 S.W.2d at 684. Thus, the decision answered all of the
questions posed by the bar earlier in 1933. The courts did have inherent power to
discipline lawyers as court officers. The disciplinary proceeding was not con-
ducted as a typical adversarial case, designed to punish the attorney, but rather as
an inquiry designed to protect the public. See note 146 and accompanying text
supra.
According to Judge Atwood, who wrote the decision in Richards, the opinion
did not break any new legal ground. See Current Events, Aftermath of Richards
case decision in Missouri, 20 A.B.A.J. 1 (1934). The history of the decision,
however, belies Judge Atwood's analysis. The case was considered important by
the American Bar Association. See Editorial, An Important Recent Decision, 19
A.B.AJ. 711 (1933). In Missouri, Professor Wheaton said that the decision "re-
quired courage, and demonstrated that in this state sits a Supreme Court of ability
and fearlessness." Wheaton, Courts and the Rule-Making Powers, 1 MO. L. REV.
261, 261 (1936). The decision was noted and commented on in both the St. Louis
Law Review and the Kansas City Law Review. See Langknecht,Judicial Regula-
tion of the Legal Profession, 3 K.C. L. REV. 54 (1935); Attorneys
-Disbarment-Authority of Court, 19 ST. Louis L. REV. 146 (1934). In addi-
tion, the decision often has been cited as support for the assertion of inherent
power in the areas of discipline, admission, and bar integration through court
rule. See, e.g., In re Machey, 416 P.2d 823, 837 (Alaska 1964); Petition of Fla.
State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 862, 186 So. 280, 285 (1938); In re Kaufman, 69
Idaho 297, 314, 206 P.2d 528, 538 (1949); State ex rel. Boynton v. Perkins, 138
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The reaction of the Missouri Bar Association to Richards was im-
mediate. It appeared that the court had assumed a power theretofore left
to the legislature, the power to determine the type of conduct justifying
discipline. Although decided on October 16, 1933, the Richards opinion
was substantially excerpted in the October 1933 issue of the Missouri Bar
Journal. 17 9
On November 4, 1933, the Executive Committee of the bar association
adopted a resolution, in light of the opinion, requesting the supreme court
"to appoint a commission . . . with power to investigate the means of
regulating professional matters."180 In adopting this resolution, the bar
referred to full regulation of the profession because the opinion in
Richards implied that inherent power was a blanket grant over the full
panoply of attorney activity. The court agreed with the bar association ten
days later and on November 14, 1933, ordered the appointment of a com-
mission of lawyers to "make a thorough investigation and study of the sub-
ject of regulation of the practice of law, particularly with a view of ascer-
iaining its most practical and effective scope and administration in this
state. '"18f
The commission filed its results with the court after May 12, 1934.182
Kan. 899, 905, 28 P.2d 765, 768 (1934); Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harr-
ington, 266 Ky. 41, 51, 98 S.W.2d 53, 58 (1936); Ex parte Steckler, 179 La. 410,
422, 154 So. 41, 45 (1934); Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 577, 87 N.E.2d
838, 840 (1949); In re Disbarment of Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 44, 266 N.W. 88, 92
(1936); In re Unification of Mont. Bar Ass'n, 107 Mont. 559, 561, 87 P.2d 172,
172 (1939); In re Hansen, 101 Mont. 490, 501, 54 P.2d 882, 887 (1936); In re In-
tegration of State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 285, 275 N.W. 265, 266 (1937); In re
McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 422-23, 132 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1956); In re Bozarth,
178 Okla. 427,429, 63 P.2d 726, 729 (1936); Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8,
40, 11 N.W.2d 604, 619 (1943).
179. Supreme Court Proclaims Its Power Over Bar, 4 MO. B.J. 157 (1933).
180. Resolution Requesting Appointment of Commission, 4 MO. B.J. 180
(1933).
181. Order of Supreme Court Establishing Commission, 4 MO. B.J. 181
(1933). The order resulted from an informal meeting after the adoption of the
resolution requesting the commission between the bar's executive committee and
the members of the court. See Move for Judicial Regulation of Law Practice, 4
Mo. B.J. 180, 180-81, 184 (1933).
The appointment of the commission, on the heels of Richards, was lauded as
"[a] new day for the legal profession of Missouri." Gaining Momentum, 4 Mo.
B.J. 210 (1933). The commission divided itself into subcommittees to study infor-
mation available from other states, regulatory procedure, the status of Missouri
law, the canons of ethics, admission to practice, eligibility to practice, and exten-
sion of commission work into general practice and procedure. See Commission on
Regulation of Law Practice Goes to Work, 4 Mo. B.J. 213 (1933). The commis-
sion's chairman was Henry Caufield, a former governor.
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The court adopted the recommendations with little change on June 18,
1934, only eight months after the Richards decision. 183 The rules for ad-
mission to the bar were taken in part from the statute, with additions
designed to upgrade the requirements for admission to the bar.8 s4
The rules relating to discipline were new to Missouri, but they have
survived largely intact to the present. The court first adopted Canons 1
through 48 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association.8 5 To
enforce the standards of the canons, the court created a bar committee in
183. See Supreme Court Adopts Commission's Report, 5 MO. B.J. 83 (1934).
The rules were made effective as of November 1, 1934. See New Supreme Court
Rules, 5 Mo. B.J. 99 (1934).
184. The new rule for admission was designated Supreme Court Rule 38. Mo.
Sup. Ct. R. 38 (1934), reprinted in 351 Mo. at xxii-xxiv (1943).
Both the statute and the rule provided for admission only to those over the age
of 21 with good moral character. RSMO ch. 78, § 11696 (1929); Mo. Sup. Ct. R.
38(1)(a) (1934). The rule required citizenship in the United States and residency
in Missouri for three months, but the statute only required residency. Compare
id. with RSMO ch. 78, § 11696 (1929). Application to take the bar examination
had to be filed under both the rule and the statute, but the rule extended the time
for filing from 10 days before the examination to 90 days before the examination
and required two affidavits from lawyers attesting to the moral qualifications of
the applicant. Compare Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 38(1)(b) (1934) with RSMO ch. 78, §
11701 (1929). The rule increased the application fee from $10 to $25. Mo. Sup.
Ct. R. 38(1)(b) (1934). The rule prevented an applicant from taking the ex-
amination until the board of bar examiners had studied the character and fitness
of the applicant and the application had been approved by the court. Id.
38(1)(c). Educational requirements were increased under the rule from a general
education at least meeting graduation from an elementary school to graduation
from high school or the equivalent and at least three years of legal study either in
law school or with a practitioner, the latter method being available only where
the student had preregistered with the court. Compare id. 38(1)(d)-(f) with
RSMO ch. 78, § 11696 (1929).
The bar examination, under both the rule and the statute, was to be given in
Jefferson City or such other location as permitted and the results were to be cer-
tified to the supreme court. Id. §§ 11699, 11702; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 38(1)(g) (1934).
Provisions for failure were changed, as the rule restricted the right to take the ex-
am after a second failure. Compare id. 38(1)(h) with RSMO ch. 78, § 11702
(1929). Under the statute, the bar examiners were required to test the applicants'
knowledge of specified subjects, while under the rule, the board had discretion as
to subjects examined, subject to court approval. Compare Mo. Sup. Ct. R.
38(1)(g) (1934) with RSMO ch. 78, § 11700 (1929). The rule expanded the re-
quirements to be met by an out-of-state lawyer seeking to be licensed in Missouri.
Compare Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 38(1)(i) (1934) with RSMO ch. 78, § 11703 (1929).
185. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 35 (1934), reprinted in 351 Mo. at'vii-xv (1943). The
canons were adopted as "the measure of the conduct and responsibility of the
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each judicial circuit, 186 gave them full subpoena power, and authorized
them to hear the testimony of witnesses. 18 7 A standard form was adopted
for informations. 18 8 Provision was made for answer by the accused attor-
ney as well as for appointment of counsel for an indigent attorney. 189 All of
these provisions are still in existence. 190
There also were provisions for investigation of complaints, for the fil-
ing of complaints with any member of the committee, for a committee in-
vestigation to determine the preliminary merit of a complaint, and for the
filing of an information, if there was merit, either in the local circuit court
or, with permission, in the supreme court. 191 Prior to the filing of an infor-
mation, the respondent was notified of the charges and of an opportunity
to be heard. 192 Trial of the matter was held in the circuit court, without a
jury, similar "to proceedings for extraordinary legal proceedings.' 193 Ap-
186. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36 (1934), reprinted in 351 Mo. at xv-xx (1943)
(hereinafter referred to as Rule 36). Each committee was to consist of four lawyers
appointed by the supreme court who would serve staggered terms. Id. 36(1).
187. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(4) (1934). Application for subpoena was to be made
by the committee chairman. The power included both duces tecum subpoena
power and declimus deposition power. The power to take testimony included
power to have the witnesses sworn. Failure to respond to a subpoena was to be
reported to the court. Id.
188. Id. 36(5). The information could allege multiple acts of misconduct in
separate counts. Id.
189. Id. 36(6)-(8).
190. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.10-.18 (hereinafter referred to as Rule 5). Rule
36(1) was substantially the same as Rule 5.10. Rule 36(4) is now encompassed by
Rule 5.14. Today, however, the respondent may request subpoenas as well. Rule
36(5) was identical in substance to Rule 5.15. Rule 36(6) was substantially the
same as Rule 5.16, except that the time for an answer was expanded to 30 days.
The court is still permitted to proceed without answer, as in Rule 36(8), after the
expiration of the 30 day period, under Rule 5.18. Rule 36(7) was substantially the
same as current Rule 5.17.
191. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(3) (1934). Today, a similar, slightly expanded in-
vestigative process exists. The bar committee may investigate, "with or without
formal complaint," any allegation of unethical conduct. If no unethical conduct
if found, the matter is dismissed. If conduct is found not to warrant a formal
hearing, a written admonishment may be administered to the offending attorney.
Mo. SUP. CT. R. 5.12. If formal proceedings are required, notice is served on the
respondent. Id. 5.13. Proceedings before the committees are kept confidential.
Id. 5.24. Records of all investigations are kept and filed. Id. 5.12.
192. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(3) (1934). The same is true today. See MO. Sup. CT.
R. 5.12-.13. The right to notice of the full charges in a disciplinary proceeding
became a matter of constitutional due process in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544
(1968).
193. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(8) (1934). Today, the local committee tries the mat-
ter. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 5.13. The trial, today, is pre-information rather than post-
information as was true in the original rules. Compare Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(6), (8)
(1934) with MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.13.
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peals were to the supreme court.194
The bar committees were given another important function: repre-
senting the full bar in investigation and prosecution of allegations of
unauthorized practice of law. 196 This is still a function of the bar com-
mittees today. 96 To fund the created disciplinary process, the court
adopted a rule assessing each member of the bar an annual fee of five
dollars, payment of which was a prerequisite to practicing law. 197 Finally,
the rules created a judicial council designed "to make a continuous study
of the organization and rules of practice and procedure of the judicial
system and its various parts" as well as to make recommendations for
statutory change to the legislature. 198
The rules later were termed the "Missouri Compromise," because the
court provided for regulation of the bar but not for integration of it. 199
The new rules, however, did attract nationwide attention0" as a result of
their innovative nature. While the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1933 had
adopted a rule conferring all disciplinary jurisdiction on two grievance
committees, 20 1 thus providing precedent for the Missouri rule, the
Missouri provisions for funding the disciplinary system, for the bar com-
mittees' responsibility for preventing unauthorized practice, and for the
creation of the judicial council, "went further ... than had been done
theretofore. "202
The adoption of these rules through the vehicle of inherent power met
the need of protecting both the profession and the consuming public, a
need previously unmet by the legislature. The traditional method for
adopting bar regulation, however, was through the legislature. Conse-
quently, the decision in Richards and the subsequent court rules were only
the first step in the process of vesting full power in the supreme court.
194. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(11) (1934). Today, following a trial by the circuit
bar committee, if the committee finds probable cause that ethical violations have
occurred, the information is filed in the supreme court. MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.13(h).
The court hears the matter directly or through a master, id. 5.18, after service of
the information on the respondent and a 30 day period for answer has elapsed, id.
5.16.
195. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(12) (1934).
196. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 5.25.
197. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37(1) (1934). reprinted in 351 Mo. at xx (1943). The of-
fice of general chairman of bar committees was created to administer that fund.
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37(5) (1934). That position exists today, with the general chair-
man acting in a supervisory capacity over the various circuit bar committees. Mo.
SUP. CT. R. 5.01.
198. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 39(2) (1934).
199. Hemker, The Integrated Bar of Missouri and the Missouri Court Plan, 5
J. Mo. B. 144. 145 (1949).
200. See Barrett, An End and a Beginning, 5 MO. B.J. 131, 131 (1934).
201. See note 146 supra.
202. Missouri Bar Studies Original Organization Plan, 6 MO. B.J. 58 (1935).
[Vol. 46740
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VI. CONFIRMING THE POWER
Like many innovations, the new court rules were challenged. The first
challenge came in December 1935 in In re Sparrow,20 3 which questioned
whether the rules created substantive law or merely codified procedure.
Sparrow was charged with misconduct occurring prior to the new rules,
20 4
but he was disciplined under the new rules. 20 5 Sparrow challenged the
disciplinary procedure on the theory that the procedure violated his due
process rights,20 6 an argument the court found to have little merit.
Initially, the court said that the respondent misperceived the nature of
discipline20 7 because he incorrectly equated it with a criminal prosecu-
tion. 208 The proceeding was not designed to punish, but rather to protect
the court. 20 9 With respect to due process, the court said that the states
could control the procedure employed in their courts and found that the
rules were procedural. 21 0 Additionally, the new rules attempted to in-
crease rather than to restrict due process by providing increased in-
vestigative procedures. 211 As a result, the rules were "designed to lessen the
likelihood of unfounded charges being brought in courts against an at-
torney at law, to his probable humiliation and injury. 21 2
203. 338 Mo. 203, 90 S.W.2d 401 (En Banc 1935).
204. Id. at 205, 90 S.W.2d at 403. The new rules became effective on
November 1, 1934. Order of Supreme Court Adopting Additional Rules, 5 Mo.
B.J. 154 (1934). The misconduct was alleged to have taken place beginning in
1933. 338 Mo. at 204, 90 S.W.2d at 402. Proceedings were not started in the
Springfield Court of Appeals, however, until September 3, 1935 (after the new
rules became effective). Id.
205. 338 Mo. at 204, 90 S.W.2d at 402.
206. Id. at 207, 90 S.W.2d at 404. It was alleged that Rule 36(3) permitted
the committee
with or without notice to the suspected party, to investigate in a summary
and informal manner any matter of professional misconduct, and upon
the testimony taken therein, to find "the accused guilty of the miscon-
duct charged"; that such procedure does not give the accused such notice
and opportunity to be heard, and to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, as constitues due process and, therefore, deprives respon-
dent of his reputation, professional standing, and property, contrary to
. [the due process clause of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV].
Id. at 206, 90 S.W.2d at 403.
207. 338 Mo. at 207, 90 S.W.2d at 404.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 206-07, 90 S.W.2d at 403-04. The new rules were said to have no
effect on the substantive rights of a lawyer. Rather, they were "mere regulatory
and procedural." Id. at 207, 90 S.W.2d at 404.
211. Id. These rules were designed to protect the lawyer by permitting the
committee to be satisfied as to the existence of the merits of a complaint before
the filing of an information. See id.
212. Id. The rules did provide an opportunity to be heard at the committee
1981]
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Sparrow thus represents an attempt by the court to solidify its decision
to regulate the practice of lawyers based on its inherent power through
court-made discip!inary rules. Mere regulation of lawyers, however, was
not the only objective of the bar. The regulation of the practice of law, or
the appearance thereof, by nonlawyers also was necessary for the protec-
tion of the public.
In Clark v. Austin,2 13 contempt charges were filed against three lay-
men 214 alleged to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
through paid representation of persons before the Public Service Commis-
sion.2 1 5 The issue presented was whether, by exercising inherent power
through rules directed primarily at attorneys, the court could regulate the
conduct of nonlawyers.21 6
In the court's principal opinion, the Richards holding was first
reiterated: "[T]he power to define and regulate the practice of law is, in its
exercise, judicial and not legislative. '21 Thus, even though the practice of
law was defined by statute, that definition could not interfere with the in-
dependent right of the court to define and regulate that practice.2 18 The
court reasoned that the constitutional vesting of judicial power in the
courts, which created the inherent power, enabled the court to "determine
the educational and moral qualifications of applicants for admission to the
bar."21 9 Because the practice of law is not confined to mere representative
appearance in a court proceeding, regulation of the profession extended to
hearing before an information was filed, as well as at the hearing after the infor-
mation was filed. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(3), (8) (1934). Consequently "due pro-
cess of law . . . [is] plainly and adequately safeguarded." 338 Mo. at 207, 90
S.W.2d at 404. The court also rejected an ex post facto argument. Id. at 208, 90
S.W.2d at 404.
213. 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (En Banc 1937).
214. 340 Mo. at 473-74, 101 S.W.2d at 979. The action arose under the post-
Richards Rule 36(12). It is interesting to note that Frank E. Atwood appeared of
counsel for the informants. 340 Mo. at 472, 101 S.W.2d at 979. Atwood's term on
the supreme court expired on December 31, 1934. See STATE OF MISSOURI OF-
FICIAL MANUAL 1933-1934, at 121. On September 19, 1934, Atwood was elected
president of the Missouri Bar Association. Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth An-
nual Meeting, Missouri Bar Association, 5 MO. B.J. 161, 243 (1934).
215. 340 Mo. at 477; 101 S.W.2d at 982. It was alleged and admitted by
respondents, none of whom were licensed attorneys, that in such hearings they
drafted pleadings and documents, advised as to strategy, and questioned
witnesses in the actual hearings. Id.
216. Id. at 490, 101 S.W.2d at 983. One of the respondents alleged that the
statute on the subject permitted the court to license attorneys only "in the courts
of record of this state," and thus, because commission hearings were not courts,
the supreme court had no power. Id.
217. Id. at 474, 101 S.W.2d at 980.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 477, 101 S.W.2d at 981-82.
742 [Vol. 46
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"the practice of law outside court proceedings" 220 and rendered the prac-
tice of law by a layman a contempt "'because the wrong doer has affronted
this court by usurping a privilege solely within the power of this court to
grant.' ' 221 The reasoning appeared to be that denial of the power to
punish the unauthorized practice as a contempt would destroy the in-
herent power to regulate the practice of law.
In what was labeled a concurring opinion, 222 Chief Justice Ellison
argued that the court's prinicpal opinion overruled Richards by holding
that the court's "power to define and regulate the practice of law is ex-
clusive" and that the legislature could not enter any field touched by the
exercise of inherent power. 223 The court's assertion of exclusive power, he
argued, would be disastrous. 224 Because the Sparrow court had equated
the disciplinary rules with procedural court rules,2 5 Chief Justice Ellison
argued that the principal opinion in Austin meant that the legislature had
no power over procedural law, thus effectively declaring unconstitutional
Missouri's recently enacted codes of civil and criminal procedure. 226 Con-
stitutional separation of powers could not be so complete as to prevent gray
areas between them. 227 As a result, "[e]ach of the three departments nor-
mally exercises powers which are not strictly within its province." 22
Recognizing that both admission to practice and regulation of professional
conduct are primarily judicial functions does not prevent the legislature,
220. Id. at 481, 101 S.W.2d at 984. This rationale was based on two theories.
First, "[w]hether or not one is engaged in the practice of law depends upon the
character of acts he performs and not the place where he performs them." Id. at
480, 101 S.W.2d at 983 (emphasis added). Thus, the legislature had no power to
bind the court by defining such acts contrary to the court's definitions. See id. Se-
cond, "[a] person may never appear in court and yet be engaged in the practice of
law." Id. at 481, 101 S.W.2d at 984. Implicit in this statement is the theory that if
the court had no power to regulate conduct by an attorney who never appeared in
court, the profession would be bifurcated, with trial lawyers subject to discipline
by the court and office lawyers subject to discipline by the legislature.
221. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 473, 176 N.W. 901, 906 (1931)).
222. Although all of the judges of the court concurred in the result reached in
the foregoing analysis, five of the judges joined in a separate concurrence. See 340
Mo. at 482, 101 S.W.2d at 985 (Ellison, C.J., concurring). This opinion, by Chief
Justice Ellison, has been recognized by at least one author as the majority opinion.
Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure,
22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 477 (1937). The principal opinion, however, also has been
referred to as the decision of "[o]ur Supreme Court." Automobile Club v. Hoff-
meister, 338 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Mo. App., St. L. 1960).
223. 340 Mo. at 483, 101 S.W.2d at 986 (Ellison, C.J., concurring).
224. See also Williams, supra note 222, at 482, 484.
225. 338 Mo. 203, 207, 90 S.W.2d 401, 404 (En Banc 1935).
226. 340 Mo. at 484, 101 S.W.2d at 986 (Ellison, C.J., concurring).
227. Id. at 486, 101 S.W.2d at 987 (Ellison, C.J., concurring).
228. Id. (Ellison, C.J., concurring).
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under its police power, from adopting reasonable laws in aid of this pur-
pose. 229 Thus, "[i]f the courts were lax and slothful in regulating the prac-
tice of law," the legislature should be permitted to act. 230
The two opinions in Austin represent the dichotomy of views on in-
herent power. Under one view, the power of the court to control the prac-
tice of law was almost absolute. Under the other, the power, though
primarily judicial, was shared like other procedural matters with the
legislature. Both sides agreed, however, that the court's ability to regulate
the legal profession extended beyond traditional court-related activities.
The impact of the reasoning in Austin on licensed attorneys and the public
became clear in 1938 in the following case.
B. R. Williams was licensed to practice law in Missouri in 1909.231 He
was elected and served as probate judge from 1915 to 1927 and was elected
and served as sheriff from 1933 to 1937.232 He practiced law from his ad-
mission to the bar until his election as sheriff, and allegedly thereafter .233
In August 1936, Williams was charged in the Kansas City Court of Appeals
with professional misconduct as a lawyer for acts related solely to his posi-
tions as probate judge and sheriff.234 It was alleged that this nonlawyer
conduct required discipline. 235 The court of appeals, however, was unwill-
ing to extend the disciplinary power this far, finding support in Richards
for the idea "that the power to disbar should be exercised within certain
reasonable statutory regulations. 236 The statute permitted disbarment, in
the absence of a criminal conviction, only for actions committed in the
"professional capacity. ' 23 7 Thus, since the charges in the instant matter
arose in a nonprofessional capacity, as judge and sheriff, and because
there was no criminal conviction, Williams could not be disciplined. 238
229. Id. at 486-96, 101 S.W.2d at 990-94 (Ellison, CJ., concurring).
230. Id. at 496, 101 S.W.2d at 994 (Ellison, CJ., concurring).
231. In re Williams, 113 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Mo. App., K.C.), opinion
quashed sub nom. State ex rel. Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo. 542, 122 S.W.2d 882 (En
Banc 1938).
232. 113 S.W.2d at 356.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 355-56. For the specific acts, see In re Williams, 233 Mo. App.
1174, 1179-83, 128 S.W.2d 1098, 1100-04 (K.C. 1939).
235. The changes covered a period of 15 years. See 113 S.W.2d at 356. Some
of the acts charged would be considered crimes. See id. The commission ap-
pointed by the court of appeals agreed with the bar committee, finding miscon-
duct and recommending disbarment. See State ex rel. Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo.
542, 544, 122 S.W.2d 882, 883 (En Banc 1938).
236. 113 S.W.2d at 359. The court of appeals found Richards to be "wholly
within the purview of the statutes governing the procedure of the court in the ex-
ercise of its power to disbar." Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 360 (quoting RSMO ch. 78, § 11707 (1929)).
238. 113 S.W.2d at 363-67.
744 [Vol. 46
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On motion for rehearing, the court found no conflict in its opinion
with either the opinion in Richards or the decision in Austin, particularly
the latter because the principal opinion did not appear controlling. The
court found no conflict with the new court rules because, as noted in Spar-
row, those rules were procedural rather than substantive. 239 The bar could
not accept such a result and consequently took the matter directly to the
supreme court to quash the court of appeals opinion. 240 In State ex rel.
Clark v. Shain,241 the supreme court eliminated any questions that might
have existed following the two opinions in Austin and issued its strongest
opinion to date on its inherent disciplinary power.
The supreme court found that the lower court had admitted the
legislature's lack of power to restrict or limit the grounds for disbarment,
but nevertheless it found that the current statute was a reasonable regula-
tion. 242 According to the supreme court, the court of appeals found "that
both the jurisdiction of the court to disbar and the exercise of said jurisdic-
tion is limited by statute." 243 The supreme court refused to accept this
reasoning: "Undoubtedly the legislative department, under the police
power, 'has a voice' in making rules with reference to disbarment.... But
the courts are not compelled to proceed under said rules. ' 244 The supreme
court also noticed that the court of appeals had indicated the proceeding
to disbar was based on the provisions of the statute. 245 In a one sentence
confirmation of its power, the supreme court said, "[The disciplinary pro-
ceeding] was instituted by the bar committees and is 'based on' the rules of
239. Id. at 370-73 (motion for rehearing). The court of appeals viewed
Richards as permitting legislative enactment in the field of disbarment as long as
the legislature did not destroy the inherent power of the court. Id. at 371. This is
attributed to the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Ellison in Clark, which was
said to be consistent with Richards. See 113 S.W.2d at 370. The "main" opinion
in Clark was viewed as overruling Richards. See id. Thus, viewed by the court, the
legislature did have certain power to regulate disbarment, as long as its exercise
thereof was reasonable. See id. at 372. The rules of the supreme court, therefore,
were only mechanical.
240. See State ex rel. Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo. 542, 544, 122 S.W.2d 882, 883
(En Banc 1938).
241. 343 Mo. 542, 122 S.W.2d 882 (En Banc 1938).
242. See id. at 546, 122 S.W.2d at 884.
243. Id. at 545, 122 S.W.2d at 883.
244. Id. at 546, 122 S.W.2d at 884 (citation omitted). The court attempted
to lay to rest any allegation of a conflict between the court and the legislature. Id.
The opinion recognized the police power jurisdiction of the legislature to enact
legislation relating to disbarment. Id. at 545, 122 S.W.2d at 884. To the extent,
however, that Clark required the use of such statutes by the courts, Clark was
wrong. Id. at 546, 122 S.W.2d at 884. "The correct rule is that the courts may
utilize said regulations. If they do so, then said regulations are in aid of our
jurisdiction to disbar and not a limitation on said jurisdiction." Id.
245. " Id. at 545, 122 S.W.2d at 883.
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this court. '2 46 The opinion below was quashed. 247 Clearly, inherent power
existed to discipline a lawyer for conduct outside the profession. 248
Although the bar had convinced the court to assert inherent power
over the conduct of attorneys and over the unauthorized practice of law,
two areas remained where the statute still controlled. One area was sum-
mary disbarment for conviction of a crime of "moral turpitude." In 1940,
the court readopted the definition of moral turpitude that existed prior to
the new court rules. 249 This statutory disbarment process remained until
superseded by court rule in 1973.250
The growth of the other area resulted from increased activity of the
courts in disciplinary matters during this period. As a result, the process of
reinstatement following suspension or disbarment also needed procedural
definition. When promulgated, the court rules contained no procedure
for a suspended or disbarred attorney to apply for reinstatement.25 A
statute, however, provided:
[A]ny attorney or counselor at law removed from practice or
suspended for a longer term than one year, on application to the
supreme court or in the court in which the judgment of removal or
suspension was first rendered, may be reinstated as such attorney
or counselor at law, in the discretion of the court. 252
The court was left the responsibility of interpreting the statute consis-
tently with the procedure defined by its new rules. Thus, when an attorney
had been disbarred, the court ruled that any application for reinstatement
was actually an application for readmission. Despite the statute, therefore,
the application had to be made to the supreme court, which alone had the
power to admit, rather than to the court that had heard the disbarment
proceeding.253 To do otherwise would have permitted the lower Missouri
246. Id. at 545, 122 S.W.2d at 884.
247. Id. at 547, 122 S.W.2d at 884.
248. On remand, Williams was suspended for two years. See In re Williams,
233 Mo. App. 1174, 1192, 128 S.W.2d 1098, 1108 (K.C. 1939).
249. See In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 142 S.W.2d 33 (En Banc 1940). The
prior definition was in In re Wallace, 323 Mo. 203, 206, 19 S.W.2d 625, 625 (En
Banc 1929).
250. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 5.20.
251. See State ex rel. Chubb v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 1227, 1233, 175 S.W.2d
783, 786 (En Banc 1943).
252. RSMO ch. 39, § 13336 (1939).
253. See In re HI S , 236 Mo. App. 1296, 1300, 165 S.W.2d 300, 301
(St. L. 1942). It was found that the respondent had sought to obtain from a police
officer confidential police accident reports for use by the respondent in personal
injury cases. The respondent had agreed to pay the officer $5 per week for the in-
formation. See In re S_____ 229 Mo. App. 44, 45, 48, 69 S.W.2d 325, 325,
328 (St. L. 1934). Following disbarment, the respondent's conduct had been "ex-
emplary and above reproach." 236 Mo. App. at 1300, 165 S.W.2d at 301.
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courts to license attorneys. 25 4 The process of reinstatement also needed to
involve the bar committees, which were charged by the court with protect-
ing the public. Thus, when a court had suspended an attorney, any appli-
cation for reinstatement of that attorney had to be heard on notice to the
circuit bar committee that originally prosecuted the action. 255 Perhaps
reflecting Chief Justice Ellison's view of legislative deference, the reinstate-
ment statute today is still the only enactment, legislative or judicial, on the
subject.
A centralizing process was evident during this period. Under the
court's view of inherent power, promulgating rules was a duty of the court,
under its interpretation of the constitutional function of the judicial
branch. These rules applied to both professional and nonprofessional ac-
tivities of lawyers, practice by nonlawyers, and the reinstatement process.
This control could, in part, be attributed to the notion that disciplinary
rules were not substantive but rather procedural as noted in Sparrow, and
were designed "to determine whether ... [the] entire course of [a lawyer's]
conduct shows unfitness to remain a member of the Bar." 256
All of these revisions were accomplished by the court inherently, i.e.,
without constitutional or statutory mandate. In the 1944 constitution, the
court was given the power to adopt rules of practice and procedure. The
issue then became whether the grant of such a power should be used by the
court to further its efforts to regulate attorney conduct.
VII. RULEMAKING AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Missouri Constitution of 1875 provided that the people would
decide at the general election of November 1942 whether a constitutional
convention should be held. 257 That vote was held, a convention was called,
delegates were selected, and the constitutional convention convened on
September 21, 1943.258 The bar association became actively involved in
254. 236 Mo. App. at 1303, 165 S.W.2d at 303. There was another reason.
Having moved to Illinois, the respondent no longer qualified under the residency
requirements of the statutes. Id. at 1304, 165 S.W.2d at 304.
255. See State ex rel. Chubb v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. at 1234, 175 S.W.2d at
787. The court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, under the statute, but the
supreme court rules were interpreted to require notice to the bar committee and
the taking of evidence on the issue.
256. Leimer v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 458, 463, 178 S.W.2d 335, 339, cert. denied,
323 U.S. 744 (1944).
257. In 1920, through the initiative process, the voters had approved a con-
stitutional amendment that required a vote in August 1921 and at the general
election every 20 years thereafter as to whether a constitutional convention should
be convened. M. FAUST, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MISSOURI: THE CONVEN-
TION OF 1943-1944, at 7 (1971).
258. For a complete discussion of the pre-vote campaign, an analysis of the
election, and the pre-convention procedure, see id. at 7-20.
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the convention process. Indeed, forty-one of the eighty-three delegates to
the convention were lawyers, far more than any other occupation.5 9
In April 1943, the president of the Missouri Bar Association appointed
a special committee to "make recommendations to the forthcoming Con-
stitutional Convention concerning the articles relating to the judiciary. 260
The committee was instructed to work with a committee of judges ap-
pointed for the same purpose under the chair of Chief Justice Ellison.
261
Their joint report contained a proposal for the constitutional establish-
ment of a judicial council in Missouri, the Administrative Council, com-
Qsed of Missouri judges from various levels.26 2 The council would have the
power "to establish rules of practice, procedure and evidence for all the
courts to be effective when approved by the supreme court." 263 Perhaps
reflecting the views of Chief Justice Ellison, as enunciated in Austin, 264 the
power was limited: any of the council's rules could be repealed or amended
by the General Assembly.
265
Despite initial rejection" by the Committee on the Judicial Department
of the Constitutional Convention,2 66 the bar proposal for rulemaking
259. Id. at 15. Also present were "seven farmers, six newspaper publishers
and editors, five insurance agents, four college professors, three realtors, two
labor officials, two salesmen, two housewives, a banker, a manufacturer, a civil
engineer, a contractor, a title abstractor and a funeral director." Id. Sixty-nine of
the delegates were born in Missouri, and at least 30 were or had been active in
party politics. Id.
260. Liberman, Preliminary Report of Special Committee to Consider Ar-
ticles of the New Constitution Relating to the Judiciary, 14 MO. B.J. 156, 156
(1943).
261. Id.
262. Report of Committee to Cooperate with Judiciary Committee of the
Supreme Court in Doing Research and Making Recommendation to Coming
Constitution Convention Concerning Organization, Jurisdiction and Powers of
the Judiciary, 14 Mo. B.J. 217, 218 (1943) (hereinafter referred to as Report of
Committee). There were to be 15 judges on the council, including the chief
justice, two other supreme court judges, three court of appeals judges, six circuit
court judges, and three probate judges. Proposal No. 21 in the 1943 Constitu-
tional Convention of Missouri, 14 MO. B.J. 284, 286 (1943) (hereinafter referred
to as Proposal No. 21).
263. See Report of Committee, supra note 262, at 218. The full text of the
proposed section can be found in Proposal No. 21, supra note 262, at 286-87.
264. 340 Mo. 467, 482, 101 S.W.2d 977, 985 (1937) (Ellison, C.J., concur-
ring). See also notes 223-30 and accompanying text supra.
265. Report of Committee, supra note 262, at 218. The repeal by the
legislature would require a special law limited to that purpose. Proposal No. 21,
supra note 262, at 287.
266. The judicial article was reported to the convention on March 10, 1944,
with no provision for rulemaking. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF MISSOURI, 1943-44, March 10, 1944, at 21 (hereinafter referred to as
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power was added to the new constitution, but in a compromised form: the
supreme court, not a judicial council, would have the rulemaking power,
except that the court could not enact rules that affected substantive rights,
evidence, jury trials, and appeals. Additionally, the legislature would be
permitted to repeal any rule adopted. 267 This legislative veto power
JOURNAL). One member of the committee, former Governor Guy Park, signed
the report "with reservations because the Supreme Court was not given the rule-
making power." Id. at 34.
267. Governor Park offered the compromise, as an amendment, during con-
sideration of the judicial article.JOURNAL, supra note 266, June 7, 1944, at 3. The
amendment further provided that no rule could be effective until six months after
enactment and publication by the court. M. FAUST, supra note 257, at 109;JOUR-
NAL, supra, June 7, 1944, at 3. Despite some attempt to defeat the amendment, it
was approved by the full convention. M. FAUST, supra, at 109; JOURNAL, supra,
June 7, 1944, at 5. The full judicial article was approved on September 19, 1944.
JOURNAL, supra, Sept. 19, 1944, at 29-30. The entire constitution was approved
and sent to the people on September 28, 1944. JOURNAL, supra, Sept. 28, 1944, at
81-82. Voting was light on the day of the constitution ratification election; only
one-third of the number who voted in the 1944 presidential election voted. Sixty-
three percent of the voters agreed to the new document. M. FAUST, supra, at 169.
By coincidence, the issue of bar integration arose again at the same time as the
new constitution. The issues of ethics rules and bar integration were joined by the
bar association in 1932. Following Richards and the new rule amendments which
created the disciplinary procedure, bar integration did not occur. By the f938
meeting of the Missouri bar, there was no desire to retain the Committee on In-
corporation of the Bar and, consequently, it was voted out of existence. Report,
Committee on Incorporation of the Bar of Missouri, 9 MO. B.J. 190 (1938). By
1942, however, bar integration was again an issue. A petition was presented to the
supreme court requesting the court to appoint a commission to study full bar in-
tegration based on the court's inherent power as announced in Richards. See Ex-
ecutive Committee Asks Supreme Court for Appointment of a Commission to
Study Integration of Missouri Bar, 13 Mo. B.J. 13, 18, 20 (1942). That petition
was denied. Supreme Court Denies Petition on Bar Integration, 13 MO. B.J. 25
(1942). A committee was charged at the 1942 bar meeting to develop a system for
full integration. Report of Special Committee to Make Survey and Report on
Appellate Courts, 14 MO. B.J. 253, 264 (1943). That committee recommended
integration of the bar by court rule. Id. Another petition for the creation of a
committee was presented to the supreme court on November 2, 1943. President's
Message, 14 MO. B.J. 299 (1943). On December 6, 1943, the petitionwas granted
and a committee appointed. Supreme Court Appoints Honorable Jesse W. Bar-
rett to Head Committee to Inquire Into Integration of the Bar, 14 Mo. B.J. 303
(1943).
A public hearing on bar integration was held at Jefferson City on January 22,
1944, at which time a vote by Missouri lawyers on the subject was ordered. The
vote approved the promulgation of rules. On September 30, 1944, two days after
the constitutional convention had approved the new proposed constitution, the
Board of Governors of the fully integrated Missouri bar took office. President's
Message on the Organization of the Missouri Bar, 1 J. Mo. B. 3 (1945).
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created a problem for the court. If the power to regulate the conduct of at-
torneys were premised on the rulemaking power, then the court would
recognize its right to act in such matters. The legislative veto, however,
allowed the legislature to limit the court's power to discipline, a philosophy
reminiscent of the Selleck rationale. 268
The problem centered on whether rules for attorney conduct were
procedural. It was complicated by the relatively new concept of pro-
cedural rulemaking power in the courts. Prior to the constitution of 1944,
there was considerable debate about whether the court possessed any in-
herent power to adopt practice and procedure rules.2 6 9 To permit such an
assertion of inherent power was at that time to reverse the common law
that left matters of procedure to the legislature. 270 It was agreed that the
courts needed rules and the courts thus, in the absence of legislation, had
inherent power to adopt practice and procedure rules. 271 Once the
legislature acted, however, any attempt by the court to act would be
sinister, assuming power beyond that granted by the constitution.
Unfortunately, decisions such as Sparrow appeared to place discipline
squarely within this dilemma by equating disciplinary rules with tradi-
tional ideas of practice and procedure. 2 72 This equation would legitimize
the concerns raised by Chief Justice Ellison in Austin. If disciplinary rules
were but rules of practice, unrestrained action by the court inconsistent
with legislative mandate would be impermissible. 2 3 For the Missouri
lawyer, this issue was resolved in 1948 in In re Conner.274
268. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
269. See Williams, supra note 16, at 482-86. For additional information on
this issue, see W. BARRON & A. HoLTzOFF, 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2 (1950); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1.3-.7 (1965); Tolman,
Historical Beginnings of Procedural Reform Movement in This Country-Pin-
ciples to Be Observed in Making Rules, 22 A.B.A.J. 783 (1936); Tyler, The
Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J.
772 (1936); Wheaton, Procedural Improvements and the Rule-Making Power of
Our Courts, 22 A.B.A.J. 642 (1936).
Indeed, at the time, there was some question as to the constitutionality of any
statute that granted a rulemaking power which allowed a rule to supersede a
statute. See Williams, supra, at 506-09.
270. See Williams, supra note 16, at 486. See generally id. at 486-94.
271. This is the view expressed by Judge Brown in Selleck. See 252 Mo. at
387, 158 S.W. at 681 (Brown, J., concurring). See also note 103 and accompany-
ing text supra.
272. See note 210 supra.
273. See notes 225 & 226 and accompanying text supra.
274. 357 Mo. 270, 207 S.W.2d 492 (En Banc 1948). Prior to 1948, the
Missouri legislature adopted a new code of civil procedure for the state. See 1943
Mo. Laws 353. As a result, the court renumbered the court rules to accommodate
them to the new civil procedure code. Thus, byJanuary 1, 1945, former Rule 35,
the Canons of Ethics, became Rule 4; former Rule 36, the disciplinary procedure,
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In April 1946, after a preliminary investigation, an information was
filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, against Harold
D. Conner. 275 Following his admission that he had converted estate
moneys to his own use, 276 the circuit court found Conner guilty of
unethical conduct and suspended him for ninety days. 2 7 After its excep-
tions were denied by the circuit court, the bar committee appealed to the
supreme court asserting that the facts of the case warranted disbarment. 278
At the time of the appeal, the court rule permitted the bar committee to
seek review of a lower court ethics determination in the supreme court. 279
The statute, on the other hand, only permitted the defendant to appeal. 280
The matter thus presented the following issue: if the rulemaking
power of the 1944 constitution prevented a rule that changed the right of
appeal and the statute did not give the bar committee the right of appeal,
could a court rule grant that right?28 1 If the inherent power of the court in
attorney discipline matters was based on rulemaking ability, the court
could not alter rights of appeal; therefore, a court rule could not grant the
bar committee a right of appeal.
In Conner,28 2 however, the court did not base its decision on the
rulemaking power. Although acknowledging this power, the court recog-
nized the other constitutional powers it possessed as head of the judicial
department and supervisor of the lower courts. 283 Those powers created an
"inherent judicial power to regulate non-procedural matters ancillary to
the administration of justice. ' '284 The court adopted a regulatory defini-
tion of inherent power and said that, although not specifically granted, the
power is essential to the proper administration of the judicial branch of
government. 28 5 Such inherent .power "is immune from destruction or
became Rule 5; former Rule 37, the cost of discipline, became Rule 6; former
Rule 38, the admissions rules, became Rule 8; and former Rule 39, the judicial
council, became Rule 10. Former Rule 40, adopted earlier in 1944 and providing
for the integration of the Missouri bar, became Rule 7. See Summers, History of
Rules of the Supreme Court, V.A.M.R., Rules 1-40, at ix-x (1960).
275. See 357 Mo. at 276, 207 S.W.2d at 493.
276. Id. at 283-84, 207 S.W.2d at 499.
277. Id. at 277, 207 S.W.2d at 494.
278. Id.
279. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 5.11 (1943), reprinted in 352 Mo. at xxvii. See also 357
Mo. at 277, 207 S.W.2d at 494.
280. RSMO ch. 93, § 13335 (1939). This statute is identical to the current
statute, RSMO § 484.260 (1978).
281. See generally 357 Mo. at 277, 207 S.W.2d at 494.
282. 357 Mo. 270, 207 S.W.2d 482 (En Banc 1948). The matter originally
had been heard by one of the divisions of the court, but was transferred to the full
court when the issue was raised sua sponte as to whether the court had jurisdiction
over such an appeal. Id. at 277, 207 S.W.2d at 494.
283. Id. at 277, 207 S.W.2d at 494.
284. Id. at 280, 207 S.W.2d at 496 (quoting Williams, supra note 16, at 474).
285. See also note 17 supra.
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frustration by the legislature." 28 6 In the court's view, regulation of attorney
conduct "is within the Supreme Court's exclusive final cognizance. ' 28 7 As a
result, the judiciary could adopt any appropriate method for reviewing
such matters, 28 methods that would be exempt from interference by the
legislature. 289 To do otherwise could prevent the supreme court from exer-
cising its exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of lower courts in
disciplinary matters. 290 Consequently, the supreme court could hear a re-
quest for review from a bar committee, almost on a de novo basis. In Con-
ner, that full review of the record was conducted, and Conner "was dis-
barred. 291
Two results emerged from the decision in Conner. First, the supreme
court settled on the regulatory definition of inherent power. The second
result is clear only in hindsight. The period from Richards in 1934 to Con-
ner in 1948 was a period of flux for the court as it tried to solidify the
powers of discipline and to design workable rules to effecuate those
powers. While there were later attacks on the procedural rules adopted by
the court, Conner was the last serious challenge to the inherent power of
the court. 292 As a result, the court could devote its time to refining the
system that it developed.
VIII. THE PROCESS OF REFINEMENT
While Conner stabilized the disciplinary process and later rulemaking
in the area of lawyer regulation demonstrated that inherent power over
lawyer discipline was not based on the constitutional rulemaking power, 29
286. Williams, supra note 16, at 474.
287. 357 Mo. at 280, 207 S.W.2d at 496 (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 281, 207 S.W.2d at 497. Such rules are, of course, subject to the
requirements of due process. Id. at 278, 207 S.W.2d at 495. The procedures
adopted in the various states often are different and do not conform to local civil
procedure rules. Id. at 281, 207 S.W.2d at 496-97.
289. Id. at 281, 207 S.W.2d at 497.
290. Id. at 281-82, 207 S.W.2d at 497.
291. Id. at 283-84, 286, 207 S.W.2d at 499, 500.
292. See, e.g., In re Mills, 539 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Mo. En Banc 1976), where
the court paid scant attention to allegations that the disciplinary process denied
constitutional confrontation or due process rights.
293. See, e.g., Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4. The preface to the rule indicates that the
order repealing former Rule 4, the Canons of Ethics, to make room for the Code
of Professional Responsibility, was adopted on November 6, 1970, to be effective
January 1, 1971, less than two months later. See also 16 J. Mo. B. 346 (1960)
(order ofJuly 11, 1960, adopting new Rule 7.03, effective October 1, 1960); 17J.
Mo. B. 303 (1961) (order ofJune 12, 1961, adopting new Rule 7.16, effectiveJuly
1, 1961); 17J. MO. B. 363 (1961) (order ofJuly 10, 1961, adopting new Rule 8.12,
effective September 1, 1961); 18J. Mo. B. 131 (1962) (order of March 6, 1961,
adopting new Rule 5.01, effective April 1, 1962); 32J. Mo. B. 562 (1976) (order
of November 1, 1976, revising Rules 5 and 6, effective November 1, 1976; no
publication until after rules already in force). But see 24J. MO. B. 409 (1968)
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Conner did not mark the end of efforts to improve the process. The exist-
ing rules had several deficiencies. In succeeding years, these deficiencies
were addressed by both the courts and the bar.
One of the difficulties in the disciplinary process is the creation of stan-
dards to be enforced. The 1908 ABA Canons, adopted in Missouri in 1934
following Richards, contained "serious problems of style, coverage, and
ambiguity. 2 94 While the canons contained moral precepts of "inspiration
and prohibition," 295 they were not specific "in definition of violation." 296
For example, Canon 20 provided general inspirational guidance regarding
trial publicity.29 7 When Canon- 20 was coupled with Canon 5, which per-
mitted the assertion "by all fair and honorable means... [of] every defense
that the law of the land permits," 298 one could argue that the canons per-
mitted trying a sensational case in the newspaper. The events following the
assassination of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy in Dallas in 1963 exposed these
problems. The 1964 ABA President-Elect Lewis F. Powell, Jr. said:
The recent events in Dallas, familiar to all of us, have stimu-
lated a new and intense interest in the Canons, particularly those
designed to prevent prejudicial publicity and to ensure fair trial.
But the need for a critical examination is far broader than may be
indicated by those events in Dallas.
Many aspects of the practice of law have changed drastically
since 1908. An American Bar Foundation Study Committee has
said that these changes make unreliable many of the assumptions
upon which the Canons were originally based. As remarkably flex-
ible and useful as the Canons have proved to be, they need to be re-
examined as guidelines for the practicing lawyer. They also should
be reexamined particularly in view of the increased recognition of
the public responsibility of our profession.2 99
(order of September 12, 1968, amending Rule 6.01, effectiveJanuary 1, 1969); 25
J. Mo. B. 378 (1969) (order of June 26, 1969, amending Rule 8, effective
February 1, 1970). The orders adopting both of the latter two rules indicated that
the orders were promulgated under the rulemaking power of the constitution. If
this were true, the order of September 12, 1968, plainly was ineffective as it was
published only four months before its effective date. In light of prior rules, as well
as Conner, it would seem that the use of such language was a mere oversight,
albeit a dangerous one, by the court.
294. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUN-
DATION RESEARCHJ. 953, 954.
295. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 6 (2d ed. 1970).
296. Id. The canons were not written "in language which would afford prac-
tical sanctions for violations." Id. at 7. As ABA President-Elect Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. would make clear in referring to a study of Missouri lawyers, public respect for
the profession varies directly with the public's perception of the enforcement of
the Canons of Ethics. 89 A.B.A. REP. 382 (1964).
297. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 20.
298. Id. No. 5.
299. 89 A.B.A. REP. 381 (1964).
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As a result of the need for change, the ABA approved the appointment
of a Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 300 a commit-
tee that recommended to the ABA House of Delegates in 1969 the adop-
tion of the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 1 The Code contained the
Disciplinary Rules, "which state clearly the obligations which a lawyer
must fulfill and the proscriptions he must not disobey, without suffering
the consequence of disciplinary action."3 0 2 The Code was not designed to
be "a static document."303 Indeed, as noted by the chairman of the ABA
special committee, "it must be amended from time to time to keep abreast
of the development of our law and society. ' 30 4 The Code was adopted by
the ABA305 and thereafter promulgated by the Missouri Supreme Court by
amendment to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, effective January 1,
1971.306 The adoption of the new Code recognized "that the bar has the
privilege of disciplining itself to a greater extent than any other profession
or calling. '30 7 It provided standards for protecting the public that "were
the highest, self-proclaimed and self-enforced.13 0
Following adoption of the rules, the bar encountered the next hurdle:
enforcement. Although the enforcement process was responsible for many
advancements in lawyer discipline and thus in public protection, there was
"a tendency on the part of many grievance committees and courts to
manifest a spirit of marked leniency in grievance cases. 3 0 9 As a result of
this leniency, the Board of Governors recommended and the ABA House
of Delegates approved in 1967 the appointment of a Special Committee on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, called the Clark Commission,
after its chairman, the Honorable Tom C. Clark, to study problems with
the enforcement of disciplinary standards through the states.310 Missouri
was represented actively on that committee by Fred B. Hulse, who was
general chairman of the bar committees.31'
The preliminary draft of the special committee's report was released in
300. Id. at 383.
301. 94 A.B.A. REP. 389 (1969). The full code recommended by the commit-
tee appears at id. at 728-96.
302. See R. WISE, supra note 295, at 8. The code was designed to carry "for-
ward the sound principles in the old canons," while at the same time creating
rules on which discipline could be founded. Id.
303. 94 A.B.A. REP. 389 (1969).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 392.
306. See note 293 supra.
307. 89 A.B.A. REP. 382 (1964).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See 92 A.B.A. REP. 134 (1967) (report of ABA Board of Governors
recommending the appointment of a committee); id. at 125-26 (adoption of
recommendations by the ABA House of Delegates).
311. See 95 A.B.A. REP. 40 (1970) (names of committee members).
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1970 and raised several issues for the Missouri system of lawyer discipline.
As has been noted, following the post-Richards rules, there still existed
statutory disbarment for conviction of a crime of moral turpitude.3 12 The
statute, still in existence today, provides discipline following conviction
"for any criminal offense involving moral turpitude."3 13 The Clark Com-
mission found two problems with discipline after conviction of a crime. In-
itially, it thought that the disciplinary hearing could amount to a retrial of
the criminal case, 31 4 a problem that already had been resolved in Missouri
in In re Lurkins,315 when the supreme court stated that the disciplinary
process could not be used to retry the criminal case. 31 6
The second problem that the Clark Commission found, however, was
relevant to Missouri. Many states, including Missouri, had no provision for
the suspension of an attorney during the period following conviction while
appeal was pending.317 Such omissions would permit an attorney to argue
that although he had been convicted in the trial court, the conviction was
not final until the pending appeal was decided and thus no discipline
could be imposed during the interim period. The commission found that
disabling the disciplinary process pending appeal reduces public con-
fidence in the profession.3 1 8 In drafting a rule responsive to the Clark Com-
mission's criticism, the Missouri court had to walk a tightrope between the
rights of the attorney and the protection of the public. Thus, in Missouri,
an order is served on the convicted attorney to show cause why suspension
should not be ordered pending the final disposition of any disciplinary ac-
tion.319 Mere pendency of post-trial motions or appeals could not stay
suspension.3 20 On the conclusion of the appeal, if the conviction is af-
firmed, the attorney can be disciplined by the court without further
testimony on the issue of guilt.321 If, however, the conviction is reversed,
312. See note 249 and accompanying text supra.
313. RSMO § 484.240 (1978). The remedy is summary in that no trial is
necessary. Id.
314. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary En-
forcement, 95 A.B.A. REP. 783, 927 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as Clark
Commission Report). The recommendations of the committee were approved by
the ABA House of Delegates. 95 A.B.A. REP. 539 (1970).
315. 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
316. Id. at 68. Respondent had been convicted of failing to file a federal in-
come tax return .and apparently sought "to introduce evidence of circumstances
surrounding the conviction." Id. at 67-68. Respondent was unsuccessful,
although the court did allow such evidence to mitigate the extent of discipline to
be imposed. Id. at 68.
317. Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 918.
318. Id. at 920. The failure to suspend pending appeal was considered one of
the key reasons for public disdain of the bar. Id.
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the suspension can be lifted, but as discussed in Richards, the criminal
reversal would not bar a disciplinary proceeding arising out of the same
conduct.32
The Clark Commission Report also criticized provisions relating to at-
torneys who become mentally ill or unable to practice because of drug or
alcohol abuse.3 23 Indicating that the scope of the disciplinary power
should encompass the "disabled attorney" as well as the "malefactor,"' the
Clark Commission succinctly stated the basis for concern for the attorney
disabled by illness: "The hardship of taking away an attorney's livelihood
because of a condition beyond his control simply cannot justify the con-
tinued exposure of the public to the danger represented by an attorney's
disability."3 24
The Missouri courts also have recognized that lawyers are human be-
ings with human frailties. Even prior to the Clark Commission, the court
had considered, in determining the discipline to be imposed in a given
case, medical conditions, such as stroke3 25 or diabetes,3 26 which may have
impaired the judgment of an attorney and led to unprofessional conduct.
Today the court recognizes that the practice of law involves stress that may
cloud judgment, impair memory, or otherwise prevent an attorney from
conducting "business and professional affairs in a clear, logical
fashion. 3 27 Such a condition, however, cannot permit an attorney to con-
tinue to practice law.3 28 To meet such contingencies, the court has
developed a rule dealing with the attorney who has been declared in-
competent or allegedly is mentally or physically incapacitated, e.g., by the
use of drugs or intoxicants.3 2 9 The rule provides for the suspension of the
attorney to protect the public, yet it permits reinstatement when the con-
322. Id.
323. See Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 906. Even though the
attorney might have been incapable of practicing law because of mental illness or
drug or alcohol abuse, if there was no violation of any of the canons, no action
could be taken. Id.
324. Id. at 908.
325. See, e.g., In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
326. See, e.g., In re O'Brien, 478 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
327. In re Houtchens, 555 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Mo. En Banc 1977). InHoutchens,
the evidence suggested "the presence of psychotemporal epilepsy reflected in
periodic states of amnesia, confusion and disorientation." Id. When coupled with
alcohol abuse, they produced "more frequent periods of irrational conduct." Id.
328. Compare id. at 26-27 (until recovered, respondent must be suspended so
public is protected) with Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 907 (even
absent ethical violation, lawyer suffering mental illness should be suspended).
329. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 5.22. On a judicial determination of incompetence,
suspension is automatic. Id. 5.22 (a). In cases of alleged incapacity, the circuit
bar committee investigates in a manner similar to that of a traditional ethics in-
vestigation. Id. 5.22(b). If other complaints are made against the attorney, they
may be stayed pending recovery from the illness causing suspension. Id. 5.22(c).
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dition has been remedied sufficiently. 330 This procedure offers "protection
of the public as well as the profession," 331 while at the same time offers the
attorney the opportunity to "recover from... health related problems." 332
The Clark Commission recognized that furtherance of a client's in-
terests often leads the attorney across state boundaries. 3 3 A lawyer's prac-
tice, therefore, may go beyond the state that first granted admission.3 34 As
a result, courts, including the Missouri courts, have had to adapt their
system of bar regulation to include the disciplining of lawyers based on
disciplinary proceedings in another jurisdiction.
The Missouri courts recognized this problem prior to the Clark Com-
mission Report, and although there were no rules or statutes governing
foreign discipline, the Missouri Supreme Court in In re Veach,3 35 through
the use of inherent power, recognized Illinois discipline of a Missouri-
admitted attorney. 336 Noting that Illinois had the same canons of ethics as
Missouri, 337 the court found nothing in the foreign proceedings to prevent
Missouri from granting comity to the Illinois decree. 338 As a result, Veach
was suspended in Missouri for his actions in Illinois, for a period equal to
the suspension in Illinois. 339
330. Id. 5.22(d). Request must be made by the attorney for reinstatement
and the application therefore must authorize the court to review all relevant
medical records. Id. The court also may have an independent expert examine the
attorney. Id.
331. 555 S.W.2d at 27.
332. Id.
333. Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 915. At the time of the
report, there was no mechanism whereby one jurisdiction advised another of
disciplinary action. Id. at 912. Yet, instances of attorneys admitted in multiple
jurisdictions were commonplace. Id. at 915.
334. See generally Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1980). Schwartz argues that this trend is leading
toward "the formation of a national bar." Id. at 1271. This trend can be seen in
bar admission as well, as at least one court has done away with the traditional
residency requirement for admission to the state's bar. See Gordon v. Committee
on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1979).
335. 287 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. En Banc 1956).
336. Id. at 758 ("The mere lack of a specific rule of this court providing for
summary action in such cases is wholly immaterial. This court has the inherent
power to discipline those persons enrolled as members of the Bar of Missouri.").
337. Id. at 759. Consequently, the Illinois violations also would be Missouri
violations. See id.
338. Id. The court noted that "respondent appeared and contested the Il-
linois proceeding." Id. The court did grant itself some future leeway, however, by
recognizing that future cases could arise whereby "recognizing the finality of the
foreign adjudication, we may not see fit to give it effect in Missouri." Id. at 759.
339. Id. at 760.
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To enforce the practice of granting comity to another state's
disciplinary actions, the court later, in In re Coleman,3 40 compelled
Missouri attorneys to advise the Missouri courts of disciplinary actions
taken against them in other states.3 4' The granting of comity to foreign
state disciplinary actions, however, did not indicate that Missouri would
automatically adopt the discipline imposed in the foreign state. Thus, in
Coleman, over one dissent, the court only suspended an attorney who had
been disbarred in Oregon.3 42
Following Coleman and as a result of the Clark Commission Report,
the court expanded its rules to provide for reciprocal discipline of at-
torneys disciplined in other states.3 43 The supreme court would compel the
appearance of an attorney disciplined in another state for the purpose of
determining why the foreign state's determination of misconduct "should
not be conclusive of said misconduct for the purpose of discipline by this
Court. '3 44 Under the rule, as later interpreted, Missouri recognizes the
finding of misconduct in the foreign jurisdiction, yet retains the right to
review independently the evidence and determinations of fact made by the
court in the foreign jurisdiction. This is exactly what occcurred in a case
where an attorney had been suspended for a period of at least two years in
Ohio. 345 The most serious of the charges against the attorney involved the
application to his own legal fee, without consent, of $480 held by the at-
torney in trust for child support payments for his client.3 46 Following the
Ohio hearing, the attorney found a tape recording that he claimed would
establish the consent of the client to the application of the money in the
manner used.3 47 Although the Ohio courts refused to hear this evidence
because it was not discovered until after the hearing,3 4s the Missouri
court, in hearing the matter for reciprocal discipline, agreed that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine the effect of this evidence
on the discipline imposed: 349 "Missouri makes its own independent judg-
340. 492 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
341. Id. at 752. The concern was protection of the public. By failing to advise
the proper authorities of discipline in Oregon, respondent "was creating a false
impression with the public, the courts and the bar." Id.
342. Id. Respondent was disbarred after mishandling trust funds. The
Missouri court permitted mitigation of the discipline imposed by considering the
death of respondent's daughter and respondent's divorce leading to his "not
'thinking straight"' at the time of the ethical transgression. Id.
343. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 5.19.
344. Id.
345. See In re Weiner, 547 S.W.2d 459, 460-61 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
346. In re Weiner, 530 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
347. 547 S.W.2d at 459-60.
348. See 530 S.W.2d at 225.
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ment as to the fitness of the members of its bar. '"3 5 0 Following the eviden-
tiary hearing, the supreme court imposed no discipline, in part because
the attorney already had been serving the Ohio suspension and had not
been practicing in Missouri for a period of almost two and one-half
years. 3
51
One of the most critical problems in lawyer discipline noticed by the
Clark Commission was the fragmented nature of the disciplinary structure
in the various stages.3 5 2 The lack of a centralized disciplinary structure
"[complicated] the already difficult task of administering effective profes-
sional discipline," as well as created in the minds of the public a sense that
local judges imposed lenient discipline on local attorneys.3 5 3 As early as
1881, in State ex rel.Jones v. Laughlin,3 54 the Missouri courts recognized
the problems of allowing courts with no power to admit the power to
disbar.3 5 5 Yet, despite such a warning, this situation existed in Missouri,
with resulting problems. Following the 1905 legislative session and the
adoption of laws urged by the bar association, only the supreme court had
the power to admit persons to practice law. Nonetheless, even after the
post-Richards court rules, the circuit courts were charged with the respon-
sibility of initially trying discipline cases.3 56 It was this practice that caused
decisions which equated the disciplinary process with traditional civil pro-
cess, thereby creating procedural difficulties. It was not an efficient way
to protect the public.
As noted by the Clark Commission, the disciplinary jurisdiction should
be "centralized ... under the ultimate control of the highest court of the
state." ' In other words, circuit bar committees would not just prosecute
ethics violations in the local courts; they would hear the cases and make
recommendations to the supreme court. 35 8 The supreme court alone
would determine all discipline. This very rule was part of a major revision
350. Id. at 224.
351. 547 S.W.2d at 461. This seems to follow both Veach and Mo. SUP. CT.
R. 5.19. The adjudication of an ethical violation is final, yet the discipline to be
imposed for that violation is left to the court's discretion.
352. Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 820.
353. Id. The Clark Commission indicated that under Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, lawyers were obligated to avoid even "the appearance
of impropriety," and as a result, the disciplinary structure should do the same.
Id. at 820-21.
354. 73 Mo. 443 (1881).
355. See id. at 449-50. See also note 69 supra.
356. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 36(8) (1934).
357. Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 820.
358. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 5.10, .12, .13, .15, .16, .18. Prior to this revision,
trial was held in the circuit court, with that court determining the facts and pro-
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of the disciplinary process adopted by the supreme court in 1973. It
represented the final chapter to date in the development of the state's
disciplinary system.
The 1973 rules accomplished several things. First, they dealt effective-
ly with the Clark Commission's criticisms, such as the mental illness issue,
reciprocity, and suspension for criminal conviction, as well as other minor
issues.3 59 Second, they revamped the disciplinary process by making
original hearings triable before the circuit bar committee, with ultimate
diposition by the supreme court, a centralized process. Third, by readopt-
ing many of the provisions of the existing rules, they showed that Missouri
already was in the forefront of those states providing effective public pro-
tection through the active use of the disciplinary system. 36 0
IX. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE AS SEEN FROM THE PAST
As noted by ABA President-Elect David R. Brink at the 1981 ABA
midyear meeting, the most important issue facing the organized bar for
the 1980s is competence. 3 61 At a conference of lawyers and others at that
same meeting, three methods of ensuring competence were discussed.3 62
Two of those methods had begun to take shape in Missouri even before the
meeting.
The first method involved specialization. Even prior to the advertising
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar,363 the
Missouri bar began a study aimed at "assuring informed and reliable deci-
sion making by enabling the public and the non-specialist lawyer to locate
359. The Clark Commission Report indicated that there should be an infor-
mal process whereby an attorney could be reprimanded privately for action that
would not be considered acceptable but that was not so serious as to warrant a
investigation or hearing. Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 888. The
commission made clear, however, that any attorney so admonished should have
the opportunity to request formal proceedings so a full hearing on the merits
could be conducted. Id. This rule was adopted in Missouri. See MO. SUP. CT. R.
5.12.
360. Many of the Clark Commission Report recommendations had been part
of the original post-Richards rules. Compare Clark Commission Report, supra
note 314, at 815 (inadequate financing); id. at 856 (no investigation without for-
mal complaint); id. at 873 (no permanent record of complaints); id. at 882 (no
subpoena power); id. at 902 (inadequate service by mail); id. at 932 (jury trial
permitted) with Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37 (1934) (providing funds); id. 36(3) (permit-
ting investigation without formal complaint); id. 36(20) (records of formal mat-
ters filed with court); id. 36(4) (granting subpoena power); id. 36(8) (service by
mail); id. 36(10) (no jury trial).
361. Lawscope, Enhancing Lawyer Competence, 67 A.B.AJ. 265 (1981).
362. Id. The three methods mentioned were "initial training of new lawyers,
peer review programs and specialization." Id.
363. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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an attorney dealing with specialized legal problems. '364 The result was a
plan for the voluntary specialization of Missouri lawyers, which was
presented to the supreme court in September 1977 .36' The plan provided
for a Board of Legal Specialization, which makes recommendations for the
creation of specialties in the practice of law in areas in which "the public
interest would be served. ' 366 Any lawyer so specialized would be required
to maintain continuing legal education in the specialty field and could
have the specialty designation revoked on a failure to meet the ideals ex-
pressed by the plan. 36 7
The second area was peer review. Peer review systems are designed to
point out a lawyer's shortcomings as reviewed by others, without the stigma
of a disciplinary proceeding. 3 6 Indeed, peer review, if successful, would
obviate the need for some disciplinary cases. Again, the Missouri bar is ac-
tively involved. In 1979, it proposed a system for peer review of appellate
cases.369 If a reviewed attorney's work is found to be unsatisfactory, the at-
torney may be asked to complete continuing educational programs to en-
sure future competence.37 0 The rules make clear that any shortcomings
noted cannot trigger disciplinary action later, consequently protecting the
reputation of a lawyer who is trying, albeit without success. 3 7 '
Perhaps Missouri needs new rules for professional conduct. The major
complaint against many lawyers is a lack of meaningful communication
between lawyer and client.37 2 Thus, it may well be that Model Rule 1.3,
dealing with promptness and diligence, and Model Rule 1.4, dealing with
communications, 373 are necessary to provide rules to enforce these com-
mon sense obligations of the legal profession. It also may be necessary to
recognize, as the Kutak Commission did, that a lawyer fills many roles,
and to structure rules accordingly.
364. Missouri Bar, Plan for Voluntary Specialization of the Missouri Bar 1
(unpublished study, approved July 23, 1977).
365. Letter from Robert 0. Hetlage, President, Missouri Bar Association, to
J.P. Morgan, Chief Justice, Missouri Supreme Court (Sept. 19, 1977).
366. Missouri Bar, supra note 364, at 2, 6. The board would include a
member of the judiciary, a faculty member of a Missouri law school, a member of
the Continuing Legal Education Committee of the Missouri Bar Association, a
young lawyer, and three practicing Missouri lawyers. Id. at 2.
367. Id. at 7-9.
368. Any hint of discipline could ruin the career of a lawyer. See Lawscope,
supra note 361, at 266.
369. See Missouri Bar, Proposed Rule for Appellate Practice Review Com-
mission 1 (unpublished).
370. Id. at 2-3.
371. Id. at 3.
372. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 1, at 210.
373. The expansion of rules into a definition of "competence" was one of the
factors that created the need for the conference on competence. See Lawscope,
supra note 361, at 265-66.
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On the other hand, wholesale change may not be necessary. The
organized bar does need to react to the criticism of it, particularly that
arising from Watergate, and what that episode represents. In fact, the
profession has acted. Richard Nixon, John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman,
John Dean, Richard Kleindienst, Charles Colson, Egil "Bud" Krogh, Jr.,
Donald Segretti, and other Watergate figures all have been dealt with
through the current system.3 74 These proceedings evidence that the system
of lawyer discipline works and is likely to continue to work with but slight
amendment.3 7- As noted by the chairman of the committee that drafted
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the document is not static. 3 76
Changing times and changing circumstances will create the need to amend
and revise current rules. To eliminate the existing Code, however, merely
for the sake of change or as proof that the bar still can police itself
overlooks the historical success of the existing system and the diligence of
the bar and the courts in creating and enforcing it.
The Missouri Supreme Court said in a recent decision on lawyer
discipline, In re Lowther,37 7 "The primary purpose of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is protection of the public .... ,378 Through the use
of inherent power, begining as early as 1834, the Missouri Supreme Court,
in concerted action with the organized bar of the state, has fulfilled
vigorously that obligation. Even when the legislature refused to respond to
public need, the organized lawyers of this state continued to press for rules
designed to regulate the profession. Today, as new problems arise, both
374. See In re Mitchell, 434 U.S. 917 (1977); In re Ehrlichman, 434 U.S. 917
(1977); In re Dean, 421 U.S. 984 (1975); In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.
1979); District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146 (D.C. 1975);
Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 919, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976); In
re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1976); In re Krogh, 85 Wash. 2d
462, 536 P.2d 578 (1975).
The National Organization of Bar Counsel, an organization of attorneys for
state bar associations, prepared a special report relating to the disciplining of 29
attorneys involved in Watergate. See N. O.B. C. Reports on Results of Watergate-
Related Charges against Twenty-nine Lawyers, 62 A.B.A.J. 1337 (1976).
375. This is also the position taken by the National Organization of Bar
Counsel (N.O.B.C.). See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 1 (1980). The N.O.B.C. notes that almost one-half of today's attorneys
have learned the current code and that those charged with enforcing discipline
have become comfortable with its workings. Id. at 2-3. As a result, "the present
Code need not be abandoned but can be amended to produce clear and en-
forceable standards of professional conduct which will continue to benefit the
profession." Letter from Allen B. Zerfoss, President, N.O.B.C., to Robert J.
Kutak (Sept. 22, 1980).
376. See note 303 and accompanying text supra.
377. 611 S.W.2d I (Mo. En Banc 1981).
378. Id. at 2.
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the bar and the court are actively involved. When the legal system has been
attacked, it has adapted. Perhaps today's highly visible bar again needs to
adapt in its efforts at public relations. The Clark Commission noted, "The
route to encouraging public confidence in the disciplinary process lies in
acknowledging the existence of attorney misconduct and showing the
public the steps taken against it.379
To abandon the entire system by needlessly scrapping the Code,
however, would adapt hard-won gains out of existence. If the past is a good
predictor of the future, the organized bar and the courts of this state will
continue to guard zealously the rights of the public to fully competent legal
services.
379. See Clark Commission Report, supra note 314, at 939. The very purpose
of licensing, according to Marks and Cathcart, is accountability. Marks &
Cathcart, supra note 1, at 233. It was this spirit that caused the Missouri bar ac-
tively to seek a new statute on bar admission in the early years of the twentieth
century. See notes 118-20 and accompanying text supra. Yet the process of
discipline remained a secret, apparently to protect "the lawyer involved against
adverse publicity which might result from groundless charges." Marks &
Cathcart, supra, at 233. The Clark Commission met that issue by encouraging in-
direct publicity, including such activities as having disciplinary board members
address school classes and hold continuing legal education courses on the subject.
See Clark Commission Report, supra, at 942. At least one state, Michigan, opens
its disciplinary proceedings to the public. See Marks & Cathcart, supra, at 233. If
the bar has a public relations problem, the answer is not a new code, but rather a
campaign to disseminate public information about the success of the existing
code.
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